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Governance processes in the public sector establish policies and institutionalize 
procedures for how organizations work together. Developing and sustaining 
these governance processes may be difficult. Efforts to develop a regional 
wireless interoperable communications network in the Phoenix metropolitan area 
resulted in a series of successes and failures. This thesis uses a classic case 
study framework to examine the governance development process from 1999 to 
2015 among the City of Phoenix, City of Mesa and additional parties. Three 
distinct phases in the governance development process were identified and used 
to conduct a comparative analysis. Seven executives involved in the process 
were interviewed to provide insight and experience related to the governance 
development process across the three phases. The comparative case analysis 
illustrates factors that contributed to the success and failure of the network’s 
governance. Recommendations are provided that other agencies may employ in 
their own governance development to accelerate the process or avoid potential 
pitfalls and achieve successful outcomes more quickly. While the case study 
focuses on the establishment of an interoperable communications system, the 
principles and examples may apply to other technology or homeland security 
efforts to establish formal cross-jurisdictional governance structures.  
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Natural disasters, human-caused incidents, pre-planned events, financial 
motivations, and other triggers have caused the movement towards collaborative 
governance systems to strengthen homeland security. The events that occurred 
on September 11, 2001 profoundly impacted public safety operations in the 
United States. Given the magnitude of the attacks on the domestic home front, 
first responders across the nation must now frequently engage in increasingly 
complex emergency response efforts. Incident commanders are required to 
quickly identify, request, and direct a myriad of resources while managing 
response and recovery efforts.  
In Bak’s Sand Pile, Strategies for a Catastrophic World, Professor Ted 
Lewis of Naval Postgraduate School stated that, “Terrorism, hurricanes, oil spills, 
electrical blackouts, transportation system collapses, and political and social 
upheaval all threaten modern society…It seems as though the challenges are 
getting bigger as well as more frequent, across many disciplines.”1 Effective 
incident response requires command, control, technology, communications, and 
intelligence. Pre-planned events such as national sports games, large-scale 
protests, and events with a significant number of participants also have similar 
requirements.  
Each of these modern day threats, whether they be routine or crisis, has 
the need for effective interoperable communications for incident management. 
Response agencies consisting of law enforcement entities, fire departments, 
emergency medical system providers, emergency management organizations, 
hospitals, and non-governmental organizations at the federal, state, county, 
tribal, and local levels must now work in a collaborative manner to achieve 
effective results. The ability to communicate and coordinate is critical to the 
successful response of these organizations. 
                                            
1 Ted G. Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World (Williams, CA: Agile 
Press, 2011), 9. 
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In the Phoenix urban area, public safety agencies have successfully 
collaborated with one another on numerous projects and programs to enhance 
public safety. This approach has worked for three National Football League 
Super Bowl Games, Major League Baseball and National Basketball Association 
all-star games, multiple annual marathons and triathlons, professional golf 
tournaments, and biannual major motor sport races.  
The Phoenix urban area encompasses approximately 9,220 square miles 
and includes 23 incorporated cities and towns, with a combined population of 
approximately 4 million people.2 The Phoenix urban area contains the nation’s 
largest nuclear power facility, the state’s largest university, fuel storage for 84 
percent of Arizona, and Sky Harbor International Airport, which is one of the 
nation’s top ten busiest airports.3 Due to its geographic size, population density, 
and significant infrastructure in the urban area, collaboration for response efforts 
is a daily occurrence for pre-planned, routine, or unexpected incidents. As larger-
scale incidents occur, the need for shared communications is even more critical.  
In addition to events occurring at the state and local level, national events 
also trigger efforts to increase collaboration. The Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States described how a 
deficiency of coordination and interoperable communications contributed to a 
lack of information sharing on scene among the first responders at the World 
Trade Center.4 Due to the use of disparate communication networks, the 
effective sharing of information did not occur among the command and control 
personnel on the scene, leading to increased first responder fatalities. The 
Phoenix urban area was already in the midst of developing a regional 
communications system when 9/11 occurred, but the National Commission 
                                            
2 “Maricopa County QuickFacts from the U.S. Census Bureau,” United States Census, last 
modified December 4, 2014, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04/04013.html. 
3 “Airport Facts,” Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, accessed December 31, 2014, 
https://skyharbor.com/about/airportFacts.html.  
4 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, authorized edition (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 297–300, 397. 
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findings further progress by encouraging jurisdictions to work together to develop 
an interoperable communications network for the Phoenix urban area.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Collaborative governance systems are often difficult to develop and 
sustain. The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers 
collaboration between regional partners critical for success. Homeland Security 
Grant Program (HSGP) guidance, the National Response Plan, the National 
Preparedness Guidelines, and other governmental publications reiterate the 
need for collaboration to occur. Research, however, is lacking on real-world 
efforts in the homeland security environment.  
Since the mid-1970s, communities in the Phoenix urban area have 
collaborated to develop numerous programs that provide higher levels of service 
and reduced costs for local residents. In the late 1990s, two of the largest 
jurisdictions in the region agreed to design, build, and operate a regional 
communications system. The City of Phoenix and the City of Mesa worked 
together to begin the process of building a valley-wide interoperable 
communications network.  
Other jurisdictions in the region were queried to determine their interest in 
joining the development of this system. The late 1990s saw little emphasis on 
developing joint communications systems, and few partnerships to share 
wireless communications networks existed. While other partnerships covered 
governmental operations such as transit, waste water treatment, and 
fire/emergency medical services, jurisdictions in the region traditionally designed, 
built, maintained, and operated their own wireless networks to support individual 
agency needs.  
At the time that Phoenix and Mesa began construction on a shared 
communications network, all other jurisdictions opted to remain independent. 
This allowed Phoenix and Mesa to proceed with a bilateral relationship. The two 
cities never formalized their relationship, however. Instead, the two bodies 
 4 
operated on nothing more than a verbal ‘handshake’ agreement. The 
communications network became operational in 2003. Upon initial 
implementation, the informal structure allowed both bodies to govern and operate 
their respective parts of the system, which provided necessary communications 
across the Metropolitan Phoenix area. Relationships were established and the 
joined networks effectively operated for several years without a formalized 
governance structure in place.   
Following the events on 9/11, the United States federal government 
encouraged regions to collaborate in building regional wireless networks. This 
effort not only sought to improve response and interoperability, but also allowed 
for the sharing of costs, personnel, and equipment. Homeland security funding 
programs continuously incentivized the need to collaborate on projects to allow 
federal grant funding to benefit multiple agencies in a given region. In the 
following years, Phoenix and Mesa continued to grow and operate their joint 
communications network.  
In 2005, a United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant allowed the City of Tempe to join the 
network.5 Tempe’s addition to the network began an effort by the original two 
participants to formalize the governance structure as additional members joined 
the network. The two entities embarked on a governance development process 
because of the changing conditions with other jurisdictions now interested in 
joining the partnership. As Tempe prepared to join the network, two municipal 
working groups sought to develop a unified governance structure in preparation 
for adding an additional member to the consortium. These groups comprised 
technical staff, operational personnel, department heads, and policy makers. 
As the governance development process progressed, several critical 
factors emerged that became contentious during the negotiations: administrative 
control, power, trust, risk mitigation, and fiscal management. Eventually, the 
                                            
5 City of Tempe, “Staff Summary Report,” December 13, 2007, 
http://ww2.tempe.gov/publicbodies/Docs/Council/SupportingDocuments/20071213ITDH1.pdf. 
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discussions became extremely antagonistic over some of the critical factors. This 
led to an impasse in the governance negotiations and resulted in the 
establishment of two distinct wireless networks. Phoenix and Tempe opted to 
form a cooperative and Mesa, along with several other partners, established its 
own organization. Thus, two entities began operating within the same region and 
competing for resources, funding, and members. This separation directly affected 
the first responders, who now had to manage operations on two separate 
systems while jointly responding to incidents.6 Ultimately, this reduced 
collaborative capacity in the region and led to strained relationships within the 
public safety community.  
With the separation of the networks, both entities continued to develop 
their own independent governance structures. While the two organizations 
continued to evolve and add additional members, a renewed emphasis on 
developing a comprehensive governance process began in 2012. Partnerships 
were reestablished and both parties once again initiated discussions on how to 
unify the disparate systems to improve operational capabilities and share 
resources within the region. The current governance development process has 
been successful, with parties agreeing to compromise and collaborate to achieve 
the vision of a single regional wireless communications network in the Phoenix 
urban area.  
This research project examines three phases of collaborative effort to 
develop a governance structure: 
• 1999–2004 – Informal Governance Operations (Successful) 
• 2004–2008 – Formalized Governance Development (Unsuccessful) 
• 2008–Current – Formalized Governance Development (Successful) 
The initial phase between Phoenix and Mesa encompassed a time from 
approximately 1999–2004 where an informal relationship operated successfully. 
The second phase, 2004–2012, saw formalized governance discussions break 
                                            
6 Gary Nelson, “Radio Woes Vex Phoenix-Area Firefighters,” Azcentral.com, accessed 
December 31, 2014, http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/20130312phoenix-
firefighters-radio-woes.html.  
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down after a third party joined. Finally, the last phase comprises 2012 to current 
discussions, where formalized collaborative governance is being successfully 
established by the multiple parties engaged in the process. Each phase has 
unique characteristics that make it successful or unsuccessful.  
The case study offered here assesses what concepts of governance, 
negotiation, conflict management, collaboration, and strategic vision may help 
the homeland security community identify the challenges and success of 
establishing collaborative governance systems. The findings may be applied to 
future endeavors to potentially avoid situations of a similar nature. Successful 
analysis of the dynamic role of conflict in the negotiation and collaboration 
process will provide guidance for other regions in the nation seeking to establish 
their own governance processes. The role of creating strategic vision also is 
examined. While the case study focuses on the establishment of an interoperable 
communications system, the principles and examples may apply to other 
technology or homeland security efforts to establish formal cross-jurisdictional 
governance structures.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Over the past 16 years, the communications collaboration in the 
metropolitan Phoenix area has experienced a series of successes and failures. 
Using conflict management, negotiation, and collaborative frameworks, this 
thesis explores the efforts between the Mesa Trunked Open Arizona Network 
(TOPAZ) and Phoenix Regional Wireless Cooperative (RWC). In order to 
analyze the specific homeland security problem space of interoperable 
communications and developing collaborative governance systems, the following 
research questions will be answered: 
• What motivated the shift from an informal governance system to a 
bureaucratic/institutionalized governance structure? 
• What are the enablers and barriers to effective collaboration in this 
case? 
• How did the collaborative process evolve over time and what was 
the impact? 
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• How can future collaborative efforts use the case findings to build 
governance development approaches to foster sustainment and 
build further collaborative capacity? 
C. RESEARCH STRATEGY 
This research uses a classic case study framework that evaluates three 
distinct time periods in the governance development process. Semi-structured 
qualitative interviews with seven participants involved in the various phases of 
the evolution of the governance development process were conducted to provide 
data for analysis. The interviews allowed participants with critical involvement in 
the process to describe why issues occurred and how the process evolved over 
time. Evaluation and action research is employed to discover how governance 
processes evolved over time through the three distinct phases of the process. 
Each phase is used for comparative analysis in a case study framework. Other 
sources of data include the following: the personal experiences of the author of 
this thesis, official reports and records, news stories, and governance 
documents.   
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THESIS RESEARCH 
In 2008, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Emergency 
Communications released the National Emergency Communications Plan 
(NECP). Upon release, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, 
stated the explicit need for jurisdictions across the nation to focus on technology, 
coordination, governance, planning, usage, training and exercises at all levels of 
government.7 This effort responded to a Congressional directive for DHS to 
create a national plan.8 The aspects of achieving interoperable communications 
are outlined in the plan and include the establishment of an effective governance 
process and structure. The ultimate goal is to achieve the vision of interoperable 
communications in the homeland security community: “Emergency responders 
                                            
7 United States Department of Homeland Security, “National Emergency Communications 
Plan,” July 2008: Message from the Secretary. 
8 Ibid. 
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can communicate—as needed, on demand, and as authorized; at all levels of 
government; and across all disciplines.”9 
Plans and documentation from federal entities contain similar language on 
the need to collaborate and develop governance processes to manage the 
homeland security response.10 While the guidance provides high-level 
recommendations, however, examples of how actual agencies have developed 
collaborative governance processes is lacking.  
While this thesis specifically analyzes the issue of governance 
development with an interoperable communications network, the principles and 
recommendations may be applied to other collaborative efforts in the homeland 
security realm. No two agencies are alike. As other agencies use these findings 
to understand the issues encountered in this case study and employ some of the 
applicable recommendations, however, it is anticipated this may benefit other 
agencies by accelerating their governance development process by avoiding 
some of the difficulties explored in this case.  
E. LIMITATION OF THIS THESIS STUDY 
All research has some limitations. Responsible research methods should 
make the reader aware of these limitations. Case studies have many advantages 
in the social sciences: the ability to use several sources of data to bear on 
research questions, the ability to use historical data to develop timelines and 
context, and the ability to be flexible with data acquisition and analysis.11 The 
case study method is also a method of choice when the subject of study is not 
                                            
9 United States Department of Homeland Security, “National Emergency Communications 
Plan.” 
10 Tammy A. Rinehart, Anna T. Laszlo, and Gwen O. Briscoe, Collaboration Toolkit: How to 
Build, Fix, and Sustain Productive Partnerships (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). 
11 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 3rd 
ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011), 148. 
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readily distinguishable from its context.12 Using a case study approach, however, 
may limit the generalizability of findings to other contexts.  
Additionally, much of this data will require a retrospective analysis by the 
participants, which may limit the reliability of the data. In order to mitigate this 
factor, multiple individuals involved in the process were interviewed for their 
perspectives to increase the reliability of the data. Participants were selected 
from multiple jurisdictions and different perspectives to reduce the bias and 
provide various points of view to increase confidence in the results. The author of 
this research was engaged in the governance development process to a limited 
extent. Since the author participated in the process, there is an element of 
research bias that will be accounted for. The author limited data input to specific 
historic details that may not have been mentioned by interviewees since they 
were aware of the author’s background. The author did not insert personal 
interpretations of processes in the phases of the governance development 
process, relying instead on statements from the interviewees to mitigate 
researcher bias.  
F. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter II reviews current literature describing various models of 
collaborative governance efforts to explore how models used in other contexts 
may be applied to the problem space of interoperable communications systems. 
Specific literature related to negotiation, conflict, collaboration, and strategic 
vision are presented to describe the common factors across all disciplines that 
are applicable to this research effort. Chapter II also covers some federal 
initiatives as they relate to the establishment of governance structures in the 
homeland security community.  
Chapter III presents the design and conduct of the research. Executive-
level participants involved in the governance development process through the 
                                            
12 Robert K. Yin, Applications of Case Study Research, 2nd ed., Applied Social Research 
Methods Series (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003), 4. 
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three phases of the process participated in one-on-one interviews. Participants 
answered a series of open-ended questions to provide feedback on their 
experiences and perspectives on the issues at each of the phases of the 
governance development process.  
Chapter IV presents the data and analysis of the participant interviews. 
Upon completion of the interviews, the audio files were transcribed for analysis 
and to capture verbatim comments. Systematic qualitative analysis techniques 
were used to examine the interview data. The transcribed data were coded to 
identify common concepts, themes, events, examples, and topical markers.13 
The data were then evaluated for comparative case study analysis across the 
three phases of the governance development process.  
Chapter V presents the conclusions and recommendations. This chapter 
summarizes the interview results, draws conclusions based on the data analysis, 
and provides recommendations based on the findings along with suggestions for 
further research efforts.  
  
  
                                            
13 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 192. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND 
The study on inter-organizational collaboration and governance 
partnerships in the private and public sector is extensive. The field of homeland 
security, however, is still in the early stages of becoming an academic discipline 
and, therefore, specific literature related to the impact of the factors contributing 
to building collaborative governance processes in homeland security is limited. 
This review is an analysis of relevant literature regarding aspects of governance, 
negotiation, conflict, collaboration, and strategic vision. 
B. GOVERNANCE 
Governance is defined as “the means for achieving direction, control, and 
coordination of individuals and organizations with varying degrees of autonomy in 
order to advance joint objectives.”14 The role of governance in the public sector 
is to develop policies, institutionalize processes, and build relationships in 
furtherance of an objective. Understanding the dynamic nature of governance is 
important to developing a comprehensive collaborative governance process. 
Studies of governance partnerships provide models for interpreting success 
factors for governance development. 
Imperial examined six watershed management programs. Imperial and 
Kauneckis analyzed the movement from conflict to collaboration while studying 
the governance process in the Lake Tahoe region from 1959 until the early 
2000s. The study provides a comparative cross-case analysis to examine how 
collaboration is used to enhance governance networks. This model 
conceptualizes the different collaborative activities and their relationships and 
allows for a multilevel analysis of governance networks. This model is called the 
                                            
14 Mark T. Imperial and Derek Kauneckis, “Moving from Conflict to Collaboration: Watershed 
Governance in Lake Tahoe,” Natural Resources Journal 43, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 1011. 
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Levels of Collaborative Action Framework (LCAF).15 In his research, Imperial 
provided a conceptual framework that encourages practitioners to address 
problems holistically rather than functioning along traditional programmatic 
boundaries.16 Specifically, he categorized his findings into three levels of joint 
action: operational, policy-making, and institutional.17  
The operational level is where organizations take action within the 
structures or rules created (or not created) by policy makers. Organizations often 
operate at this level since it is difficult or impossible to accomplish a task without 
collaborating. Additionally, greater public value is often generated through joint 
action versus operating independently.18 Operational processes typically focus 
on some form of service delivery. Processes at the operational level may be 
inherently temporary or ad hoc, whereas others may be designed to endure over 
time.19 Operational collaboration is typically characterized by limited established 
policy, but has a focus on taking action to accomplish a task or objective. The 
operational level also does not focus on the development or creation of policy; 
rather, the focus is entirely on accomplishing an objective.  
The policy-making level is characterized by activities that occur as a 
steering function to improve communications among actors, coordinate actions, 
and integrate policies in ways that advance collective goals.20 Policy making 
often does not have a direct impact on real-world operations. Rather, individual 
or collective policy-making activities determine, enforce, continue, promote, 
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16 Ibid., 283. 
17 Ibid., 288–289. 
18 Ibid., 289. 
19 Ibid., 290. 
20 B. Guy Peters and John Pierre, “Governance without Government? Rethinking Public 
Administration,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 8, no. 2 (1998): 223–43. 
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enhance, constrain, or alter actions at the operational level.21 Additionally, policy 
making includes collaborative activities such as the creation of work groups, task 
forces, advisory committees, and other formal or informal processes that are 
important because they help members find new ways to work together.22 These 
activities are designed to share knowledge, share resources, solve problems, 
build relationships, and develop trust.23 At this level, the concept of shared vision 
is also critical to successful collaboration. Vision is a function to allow disparate 
groups to resolve disagreements and is a powerful motivator to accomplish 
successful governance and work together long-term.24 
Institutional-level collaborations are activities that “influence, constrain, 
enhance, or promote actions at the operational and policy-making levels.”25 This 
level seeks ways to institutionalize shared policies and norms. A common 
technique is the formalizing of a memorandum of understanding or 
intergovernmental agreement.26 Finding ways to institutionalize policies is critical 
to ensuring that operational activities are carried out.27 The formalization process 
at the institutional level also establishes formal governing rules, decision-making 
processes, parameters for action, and conflict resolution mechanisms.28 The 
collaborative organizations also become less reliant on individuals and personal 
relationships, which improves resiliency and sustainability of the governance 
mechanism.29 Understanding the three levels of collaboration as a governance 
strategy evolves allows for the analysis of the governance development 
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processes. This also ensures that the appropriate stakeholders are involved in 
the process to create collaborative organizations.  
Public managers are tasked with improving operations and creating 
partnerships to increase public value by having agencies work together, rather 
than separately.30 A challenge is to find methods to improve governance when 
the capacity for solving problems is dispersed across many agencies and when 
few organizations can accomplish their mission by acting alone.31 According to 
Imperial, this process is “inherently political and involves bargaining, negotiation, 
and compromise.”32 Bardach also noted that it is common to find that 
collaborative efforts at one level lead directly, or indirectly, to activities at other 
levels, which gives these processes an evolutionary and emergent character.33  
Using the three-level framework, this study provides insight to the 
governance process that enables statutes, resources, programmatic structures, 
social norms, and other relationships between organizations to evolve over 
time.34 This article is particularly relevant because it documents the early periods 
of conflict and resulting negotiation techniques used to eventually lead to a 
collaborative governance structure. Work across these three levels—operational, 
policy-making and institutional—inevitably surfaces conflict among various 
organizational stakeholders. This study also demonstrates the evolution of 
conflict to collaboration in the process.  
Imperial and Kauneckis built on Bardach’s theory of emergence in the 
governance process, noting that new relationships develop based on trust, 
mutual understanding, and understanding that cooperation could be pursued in 
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32 Ibid.  
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some areas, while disagreement remained in others.35 Additionally, they found 
that the role of leadership was an important factor with the emergence of 
successful governance processes. The leadership roles of senior individuals who 
demonstrated a willingness to negotiate and shift away from previous positions 
were also examined as success factors in the study.36 
These authors also found that collaboration increased when organizations 
moved away from zero-sum processes to win-win situations.37 When process is 
moved to the policy-making or institutional levels, a broader range of interests 
are possible than at the operational level. Accordingly, collaboration can focus 
more on win-win or at least win-no-lose situations.38 These situations are not 
optimal for either party; neither side wins or loses. The result is compromise. 
Collaboration also tends to be a trial and error process “in which the outcomes of 
one effort such as trust become precursors for subsequent cooperative efforts.”39 
Imperial and Kauneckis reveal the importance of trust and relationships in 
the governance process. Early collaborative governance efforts often exhibit a 
limited amount of trust and weaker relationships. Once relationships and trust 
have developed, however, there is a deliberate effort made to maintain that 
social capital.40 Their longitudinal study indicated that while there is no single 
formula for developing trust and relationships, an important component of the 
process is frequent and repeated interactions to foster trust.,4142 
In summary, research shows that governance is a collaborative process 
that works when efforts highlight common interests and build on trust and 
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36 Ibid. 
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38 Ibid., 1048. 
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40 Ibid., 1051. 
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relationships that develop through interaction and shared vision.43 Governance 
develops over time as a series of agreements upon certain aspects of 
maintaining a cooperative relationship, along with a willingness to disagree on 
others. Healthy discourse is often beneficial to stimulating policy change and 
agreement.44 The discourse among participants may create conflict in the 
governance development process, but it also creates opportunities for 
organizations to work together in ways that improve service delivery and in this 
problem space to increase interoperable communications capabilities.  
C. NEGOTIATION 
As organizations develop and evolve, they often knowingly or unknowingly 
engage in various types of negotiation in the course of establishing collective 
partnerships. Negotiation “is a process by which two or more parties attempt to 
resolve their opposing interests.”45 Business examples are abundant in literature 
to explain the nuances of successful and unsuccessful negotiation techniques. 
Often, these interactions relate to cost/benefit analysis and typically revolve 
around finances or control. In the negotiation process, partners often strive for 
efficiency and equity as overarching factors to a successful venture.46 Other 
aspects of negotiation include collaboration, bargaining, and power play.47 
These concepts are not unlike challenges facing the homeland security 
community as partnerships are forged and collaborative or joint systems 
established. The role of trust and acceptance of risk makes the process of 
negotiation just as critical for homeland security coalitions as those in business or 
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other public sector organizations.48 The literature reveals many case studies of 
failed and successful negotiation strategies in the public and private sector that 
may relate to homeland security. While not specific to governance in the 
interoperable communications field, these concepts provide frameworks for 
analysis of the activities taking place within the problem space examined in this 
thesis.  
Research indicates there are a series of strategies available for 
addressing a negotiation situation. Fisher, Ury, and Patton provided an analysis 
of successful negotiation strategies that focus on addressing problems, not 
positions.49 They described a method of principled negotiation developed at the 
Harvard Negotiation Project that decides issues based on merits, rather than 
through a haggling process on what each side says it will and will not do.50 One 
of their suggestions is to separate people from the problem and focus on 
interests and not positions.51 When entities involved in a negotiation situation 
take positions, they begin to endanger the ongoing relationship in addition to not 
compromising and reaching consensus.  
There are two kinds of interests: substantive and relationship.52 
Substantive interests are those in which the parties’ relationship tends to become 
entangled with their discussions on substantive issues.53 On both ends of the 
negotiation, people and problems are likely to be treated as one. This may lead 
to anger over the situation, which is likely to be construed as a personal attack 
rather than disagreement over the problem.54 Participants are also likely to draw 
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on unfounded inferences, which they then treat as facts about intentions and 
attitudes.55  
Relationship interests are those that focus on maintaining the positive 
relationship between the parties and separate people from the issue.56 A 
negotiation as a contest of will over positions aggravates the process.57 A focus 
on maintaining a relationship allows for both parties to feel valued in the process 
and seeks to separate the relationship from the substance and deal directly with 
the problem.58 Another important aspect to relationship interests is to not neglect 
one’s own issues with anger and frustration in order to keep the relationship 
harmonious.59 
When parties involved discuss each other’s perceptions, they are better 
able to focus on interests and not positions to reach consensus. Additionally, an 
approach of looking forward and not back is a key success tactic in a negotiation 
process.60 When attacks on a particular position occur, there is a tendency to 
attack the person and not the problem. Fisher, Ury, and Patton described the 
need to not attack a position, but rather look behind the position to determine the 
nature of their position to successfully address underlying interests represented 
by that position.61 Additionally, create options for mutual gain and insist on 
objective criteria to reach compromise.62 Objective criteria is a series of 
principles to which both parties can agree and negotiate in an honest and 
straightforward manner.63 
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Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry provided six characteristics of a negotiation 
situation. These include the involvement of two or more parties, a conflict or 
dispute that needs attention, parties negotiating by choice, an expectation of a 
give-and-take process, parties searching for agreement rather than conflict, and 
the management of tangibles.64 One key characteristic is that the parties need 
each other to achieve their preferred objectives or outcomes. Alternatively, they 
choose to work together because the possible outcome is better than they can 
achieve working on their own.65  
In complex negotiations, both distributive and integrative bargaining may 
occur. In a distributive bargaining situation, the parties accept the fact that there 
can only be one winner given the situation, and they pursue a course of action to 
be that winner.66 Integrative bargaining attempts to find solutions so both parties 
can do well and achieve their goals.67 As intergroup conflict occurs between 
organizations, negotiations at the organizational level can be the most complex. 
The need to emphasize commonalities between parties and minimize differences 
is critical to being able to successfully manage a compromise.68 Commonalities, 
or agreements on principle, can also be used to take an integrative approach to 
complex negotiations that also include distributive aspects. This facilitates an 
overall collaborative rather than competitive interaction.69 
The creation of a coalition is also important to moving a process forward. 
A coalition is a collection of two or more parties within a larger social setting who 
work together to pursue mutually desirable goals.70 Additionally, a winning 
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coalition is one in which the parties that are partners are able to be readily 
counted upon.71 Once again, there is an emphasis on creating an effective group 
to conduct negotiations, one that focuses on interests and not positions.72 The 
establishment of effective coalitions is also critical to prevent conflicts from 
escalating into damaging disputes.73 
Watkins discussed that, in negotiations, strategy follows structure and 
strategy shapes structure.74 Watkins developed a model that demonstrates how 
negotiations can be analyzed in terms of relationships among structure, strategy, 
process, and outcomes. This is known as the SSPO model.75 The structure of 
complex negotiations can be analyzed along seven dimensions: issues, rounds, 
rules, attitudes, parties, levels, and linkages.76 Issues describe the number of 
matters being addressed, from one to many. Rounds indicate the number of 
interactions that may occur in the process, from one to many. Rules range from 
fixed to negotiable rules. Attitudes range from positive preexisting attitudes to 
strongly negative attitudes. Parties range from two to many involved in single 
negotiation. Levels refer to the number of interacting levels engaged in the effort. 
Finally, linkages describe the overlapping set of parties that may be involved in a 
negotiation effort.77 This model allows complex negotiation situations to be 
analyzed along the dimensions to better understand the process and where 
improvements may be made. A focus on these elements can assist with 
enhancing structure and shaping strategy.  
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The governance development process is a series of collaborative efforts 
that often involve negotiation situations as compromise is sought and 
agreements are reached. Understanding the aspects of successful negotiation is 
important to improving the collaborative governance development process and 
establishing structure for success.  
D. THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 
Mayer explored the dynamics of conflict extensively. Much like Lewicki, 
Mayer focused on the distributive versus integrative nature of power and the 
impact this has on conflict. In his text, Mayer described power as integrative 
when parties use their power to increase the overall influence of all the parties 
involved in a dispute or negotiation. When parties attempt to achieve their 
interests by directing enough power at others to force a compromise or 
concession, then power is being applied in a distributive way.78 As conflict 
occurs, participants in the process must listen to the other parties involved in a 
conflict and understand the cognitive level at which they are experiencing 
disputes.79  
Many forms of conflict ameliorate or resolve over time or the dispute 
moves to a new stage, but there are likely elements of the conflict that will 
continue.80 While these conflicts may morph over time, Mayer noted that change 
usually occurs when the environment or structure in which they exist is altered, 
the individuals involved in the conflict significantly mature or evolve, or new 
parties are involved in the process.81 
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Conflict may result in a deterioration of trust or breakdown in the 
collaboration process. Where parties are in conflict, they are likely to treat what 
their counterpart says with suspicion. Similarly, they may feel ideas that they 
offer are immediately met with abrupt and unambiguous dismissal.82 If this 
conflict is not framed constructively, impasse is likely to result. Impasse is not 
always to be considered a negative consequence of conflict. At times, impasse is 
met for very good reasons and entities are often content to be there.83 An 
impasse might actually be a natural and frequently helpful part of the conflict 
process that allows conflict to be addressed and resolved at a later time. 
Thomas further explored the role of conflict and conflict management. He 
posited that conflict may have constructive as well as destructive effects, 
depending on its management.84 In his writings, conflict is categorized using five 
conflict-handling orientations, which are plotted according to a party’s desire to 
satisfy its own and others’ concerns.85 Figure 1 depicts this model: 
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Figure 1.  Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument86 
This model is known as the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument 
(TKI).87 Five conflict-handling modes are described: competing, collaborating, 
compromising, avoiding, and accommodating.88 Each of the five modes 
represents a different balance of assertiveness and cooperativeness describing 
how conflict is handled. While this model was originally intended to identify styles 
of individuals, similar conflict-handling modes may be applied to organizations as 
well. This model can be used as a descriptive representation of how 
organizations engage in conflict and what dimensions are being emphasized. 
Using the TKI, it is possible to quantify how conflict is being enacted on the 
distributive and integrative dimensions.   
                                            
86 Ed Batista, “Conflict Modes and Managerial Styles,” 2007, accessed November 8, 2014, 
http://www.edbatista.com/2007/01/conflict_modes_.html. 
87 Kenneth W. Thomas and Ralph H. Kilmann, “An Overview of the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict 
Mode Instrument,” 2009–2015, http://www.kilmanndiagnostics.com/overview-thomas-kilmann-
conflict-mode-instrument-tki. 
88 Kenneth W. Thomas, “Conflict and Conflict Management: Reflections and Update,” 
Journal of Organizational Behavior 13, no. 3 (May 1992): 266. 
 24 
E. COLLABORATION 
Coordination and collaboration have received significant attention post-
9/11 as critical factors to improving our homeland security capabilities and 
response.89 At its core, homeland security is about cooperation and coordination. 
Literature specific to homeland security contends that coordination at all levels of 
government, including inter-government at the local level, is necessary for proper 
management of large-scale incidents and to improve response capabilities.90 
The events on 9/11 not only created a stress test for operations, but also for 
political institutions that highlighted the lack of collaboration.91 
With funding being allocated for the development of collaborative 
ventures, efforts have revolved around the need for agencies within regional 
areas to develop partnerships and collaborate on multi-discipline/multi-
jurisdictional ventures.92 In the years that followed 9/11, there were also 
extensive efforts from the federal level to direct agencies to more effectively 
collaborate and coordinate their emergency preparedness efforts.93 
In 2008, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office 
of Emergency Communications (OEC) published the National Emergency 
Communications Plan (NECP). This document specifically acknowledged the 
need for agencies from across the nation to collaborate and work collectively to 
improve our nation’s ability to communicate and coordinate.94 The NECP 
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specified that one of the capabilities needed was the establishment of an 
effective governance process and structure. To achieve an effective future state 
in governance, they published the capabilities chart shown in Figure 2: 
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Governance is one of the capabilities outlined in the chart.96 Objective one 
of the NECP specifically called for the development of formal governance 
structures and the identification of clear leadership roles through collaborative 
efforts.97 Governance is also a strategy and planning process, both of which are 
critical to homeland security efforts. While the plan outlines several initiatives, 
specific guidance on how to effectively collaborate to establish an effective 
governance development process is lacking.  
These capabilities were drafted from the SAFECOM Interoperability 
Continuum. This document is the benchmark in which interoperable 
communications systems are measured in terms of achievement and 
effectiveness. The continuum specifically has five lanes of successful 
interoperable communications, with governance being one of those lanes. Figure 
3 provides a graphical representation of the continuum:  
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Figure 3.  Interoperability Continuum from DHS Project SAFECOM98 
The highest level of success is a regional structure that integrates within a 
statewide framework. What is missing from this guidance is a detailed process to 
achieve this governance approach. While federal strategic direction is important, 
the documentation and literature related to the issue surrounding how 
collaboration occurs in the governance lane is lacking from federally published 
interoperable communications guidance documentation.   
The COPS Office did produce a book in 2001 that discussed steps for 
successful governance collaboration.99 There is an example of some success 
factors in the text, but lacking are examples of collaborative efforts that fail. It is 
important to note that the factors that cause collaborative efforts to fail, as well as 
succeed, are critical to analyze in order to develop recommendations for future 
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success. The text was also published before significant homeland security efforts 
ensued post-9/11. 
While collaboration in the homeland security field is encouraged, and even 
required for some funding opportunities, many collaborative efforts often fail to 
produce innovative solutions or properly balance stakeholder concerns.100 
Collaboration often occurs in an iterative fashion over time and involves 
individual participants working together while representing the interests of 
organizational stakeholders.101 Understanding the process is critical to 
successfully developing comprehensive collaborative governance processes.  
Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas extensively studied the effects of 
collaborative capacity in the homeland security arena. They noted that studies 
about the need to collaborate are prevalent, but less prevalent are studies about 
how to collaborate.102 The authors provided a framework by which to analyze 
collaboration related to homeland security needs. They term this the Inter-
Organizational Collaborative Capacity (ICC) model.103  
The model is designed to “provide a framework for examining the enablers 
and barriers to developing interagency collaboration.”104 In order to create 
collaborative capacity, an organization must create a condition where driving 
forces (enablers) are greater than restraining forces (barriers).105 The ICC model 
identifies five domains for building collaborative capacity: purpose and strategy, 
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structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives, and people.106 A graphical 
representation is presented in Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4.  Inter-Organizational Collaborative Capacity Model107 
“Purpose and strategy” can be driven by a common risk, threat, or goal 
that enables a collaborative effort. This is often described as “felt need” to 
collaborate.108 The role of a vision or recognition of common interests is also part 
of purpose and strategy. When a broader set of interests or a common goal is 
identified, more effective collaboration may occur.109 “Structure” includes the 
formal power and authority of those engaged in the collaborative effort as well as 
processes and policies that effect collaboration.110 “Lateral mechanisms” 
represent the trust and effective communication required for a collaborative 
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effort.111 “Incentives” may be a series of rewards or gains that create an 
opportunity to collaborate.112 “People” is the final category that describes the role 
of individuals in the collaborative process, specifically their need to move beyond 
their own narrow interests and begin to appreciate others’ views.113 
Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’ work provides 13 factors, which can be 
applied to a problem or case study in an effort to measure collaborative 
capacity.114 This work provides a model to explore the issues surrounding the 
movement from an informal to a formal governance structure and the resulting 
increase (or decrease) in collaborative capacity because of actions of the parties 
involved in the process.   
F. STRATEGIC VISION 
A strategic vision is “an articulation of what public sector organization 
should be doing in the long term and what it is trying to achieve.”115 In order to 
effectively manage change and institute a shift in direction, public sector 
organizations must develop a vision or strategic goal.116 A vision may be used to 
bring about a comprehensive change and shift the balance away from previous 
interests. The creation or implementation of a vision or mission provides a useful 
tool for accountability, ensures results for the organization and encourages 
developing partnerships.117  
Strategic visions provide a guiding system to drive programmatic changes. 
There are also a number of common elements contained in a strategic vision. 
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First, there must be an emphasis on problem solving and addressing a specific 
issue.118 Second, the vision must allow the organization to be responsive to its 
service users in the public sector.119 Third, there must be an intention to make 
use of partnerships or alliances in a number of different ways that are counter to 
traditional methods.120 Finally, strategic visions in modern public sector 
organizations often stress an end to secrecy and inflexibility practiced by older 
bureaucratic forms.121  
With the implementation of a vision and focus on organizational change, 
there tends to be a series of conditions that are present to facilitate this 
shift.,122123 There are a few notable conditions. First, people inside and outside 
of the organization must share the view that there is a need for improvement or 
change. In addition, a new person or group comes in to act as a change agent 
and lead the effort or a person inside is empowered to lead the change. The role 
of top executives is also important to the effort. If these top-level executives 
involve themselves in the change effort or become heavily engaged, they may 
facilitate a shift towards a new vision. Finally, participants often use success to 
reinforce results, and the results become accepted and institutionalized.124 
When establishing a strategic plan or implementing a new vision, 
successful managers often use practice and experimentation to achieve their 
results.125 A manager seeking change will often develop an idea or vision of what 
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needs to change, articulate it in some form, and incrementally move along the 
process to find a way to accomplish the change.126 This process demonstrates 
that the implementation of a new strategic vision is often a process of trial and 
error along with experimenting with the integration of task, resources, and 
environment.127 
Once conditions are present to facilitate a new strategic vision and the 
process implemented, the ability to waive traditional bureaucratic rules seems to 
be a key factor in stimulating change and reform.128 Once new processes and 
structures are in place, consistently stressing the importance of communication—
up, down, and all around—is important to executives, potential partners, and 
every member of the organization.129 New strategic visions communicated from 
the top throughout the involved organizations improves the possibility that the 
organizational shift will occur and achieve success.  
Timing is also critical for changes to occur or implementing a new strategic 
vision.130 While the need for change and pressure to implement change are 
factors, the timing and approach impact the reaction to change.131 Once 
strategy, communications, and timing are determined, the need to sustain a 
vision is also essential to successful change. Sirkin defined four factors that 
determine the outcome of any transformation initiative.132 First, the duration of 
time until the change program is completed.133 Second, the project team’s 
                                            
126 Khademian, Working With Culture, 48. 
127 Ibid.  
128 L. R. Jones, From Bureaucracy to Hyperarchy in Netcentric and Quick Learning 
Organizations : Exploring Future Public Management Practice, Research in Public Management 
(Unnumbered) (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub. Inc., 2007), 117. 
129 Ibid., 118. 
130 Alan R. Shark, CIO Leadership for Public Safety Communications: Emerging Trends and 
Practices (Alexandria, VA: Public Technology Institute, 2012), 198. 
131 Ibid.  
132 Harold L. Sirkin, Perry Keenan, and Alan Jackson, “The Hard Side of Change 
Management,” Harvard Business Review 83, no. 10 (October 2005): 108–18. 
133 Ibid., 110–111. 
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performance integrity and the ability to complete the initiative on time.134 Third, 
the commitment to change that top management and employees affected by the 
change display.135 Finally, the effort over and above the usual work that change 
demands.136 
G. CONCLUSION 
Since the events on 9/11, the issue of collaborating and developing 
regional interoperable communications systems has been at the forefront for the 
first responder and homeland security community. Much of the literature currently 
available does not specifically address the issues related to forming these public 
safety governance structures and the associated problems with cooperation and 
collaboration to accomplish interoperable, regional technology systems. Much is 
known about the individual aspects of the overall organizational design, 
negotiation processes, collaboration, and emergence/governance process as it 
relates to business or other public sector models. A review of the literature 
suggests there is a gap in applying these concepts as they unfold over time in a 
homeland security context, such as developing governance of an evolving 
regional public safety communications system.  
The strength of the existing literature is the amount of information 
available and empirical data regarding themes that impact effective collaborative 
governance development processes. This case study will provide the opportunity 
to apply the current literature and participant feedback/observation to a situation 
that has developed and evolved over a significant time. This will provide further 
opportunities for research, evaluation, or capture lessons learned and best 
practices for future similar endeavors. This study may also contribute to the 
developmental aspects of interagency collaboration in a homeland security 
context.   
                                            
134 Sirkin, Keenan, and Jackson, “The Hard Side of Change Management,” 111–112. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY 
This thesis explores the development of a collaborative governance 
system for a regional communications network. To capture the changing aspects 
of the governance process, a case study explores the dynamics of five cities and 
two regional cooperatives over 16 years. The network’s genesis was an informal 
governance structure established in the late 1990s between the City of Phoenix 
and the City of Mesa. The purpose was to design, build, and implement a 
regional wireless communications network. Starting in 2004, these two 
organizations attempted to formalize their governance structure, and this 
eventually led to the separation of the joint venture. In 2008, these same 
organizations once again formed a partnership to establish a collaborative 
governance process. This latest effort has been successful in developing and 
implementing a formal system. The City of Phoenix and the City of Mesa initiated 
the early process, but additional partners were added in the later phases of the 
governance development process, with 20 participating jurisdictions today. 
Research methods were chosen to study three distinct phases of the governance 
development process: 
• 1999–2004 – Informal Governance Operations (Successful) 
• 2004–2008 – Formalized Governance Development (Unsuccessful) 
• 2008–Current – Formalized Governance Development (Successful) 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
In total, seven participants were selected because of their significant 
exposure to the governance development process across each phase. The 
participants hold executive-level positions and were selected based on their 
ability to provide constructive information and insights on the various phases of 
the governance development process.  
Individuals interviewed were selected based on their strategic and policy-
making role within their respective agencies. Due to the authority level of the 
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participants, they also represented their organizational insights on the process. 
Participants were experienced, knowledgeable, and offered a variety of 
perspectives on the process to gather qualitative data for analysis. While not all 
participants were involved in all phases, each was able to provide details on the 
phases in which they had experience as well as historical background on prior 
phases in which they may not have directly participated.  
Participants were selected from multiple jurisdictions and from different 
perspectives to reduce the bias and provide for various points of view to increase 
confidence in the results. Throughout this thesis, participants will be referred to 
by participant code. Table 1 shows the participant code, the agency they 
represent, their role at the time of the process, and the phases in which they 
were involved:  
 
Table 1.   Participant Detail 
C. INTERVIEW PROCESS 
In accordance with Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) protocols, an 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) package was completed for submission, review, 
and approval. IRB approval was obtained to conduct human subject research.137 
All aspects of the interview process followed established NPS protocols.138   
The seven participants received a recruitment letter describing the nature 
of the research. A copy of the recruitment letter is available in Appendix A. The 
                                            
137 NPS IRB Protocol Number: NPS.2015.0001-IR-EM2-A. 
138 Specific information detailing the NPS research protocol is available at 
http://www.nps.edu/Research/IRB_Applications.htm.  
Participant Code Agency Role Phases Involved
A City of Mesa Assistant Fire Chief I, II, III
B TOPAZ Regional Wireless Cooperative (Mesa) Executive Director II, III
C City of Tempe City Manager II, III
D Regional Wireless Cooperative (Phoenix) Executive Director II, III
E City of Scottsdale Chief Information Officer II, III
F City of Phoenix Enterprise Technology Manager I, II, III
G City of El Mirage Police Chief II, III
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completion of an informed consent document describing the purpose and nature 
of the study, the rights provided as a participant, and the acknowledgement the 
interview would be digitally recorded and transcribed, was completed by each 
participant prior to the interview being conducted. A copy of the consent form is 
provided in Appendix B. Participation in the interview was strictly voluntary, with 
no compensation provided for participating in the research. All participants 
consented to be named in the study if needed.  
Interviews were conducted one-on-one in a private setting of the 
participant’s choosing, with no influence from executives or outside personnel. 
Each interview lasted approximately 60–90 minutes. Semi-structured, open-
ended interviews were conducted with a series of lead questions and follow-on 
probe questions based on the participant’s response. The interview began with 
an overview of the three phases, describing the time frame for each, to allow the 
participant to reference the phases throughout the interview. The structured 
interview questions provided below attempted to understand the development 
process: 
• What was your role and responsibility in the governance process? 
• What governing structure was in place during each stage of the 
process? 
• What were the successes and issues encountered with each phase 
of the process? 
• What was the focus of the group participating in the governance 
process (i.e., operational versus strategic)? 
• How did the process fit into the Thomas Kilmann Conflict Mode 
Instrument at the organizational level? 
• What was the motivation to move from each stage of the process? 
Since each participant had a unique role in the process, open-ended 
follow-on probe questions were asked to elicit further clarification. This method 
was selected to allow participants to describe their experience in the process with 
nominal direction from the researcher. 
The interviews were digitally recorded so that verbatim data was captured 
to identify themes. Following the interview, the audio files were transcribed. 
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Transcripts yielded 164 pages of text that were used for the analysis. Upon 
completion of the transcription, the audio recordings were destroyed to eliminate 
any personally identifying information (PII) associated with audio recordings.   
D. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
The coding process was derived from Boyatzis’s guide to developing 
thematic code.139 Comments made during the interviews were broken down into 
data units. These descriptive blocks of information were examined together to 
discover themes and variations, and to portray meaning.140 These themes were 
evaluated using relevant theories and conceptual models to identify factors that 
contributed to both the successes and the challenges in the development of this 
governance process. Coding of the transcribed data was conducted to recognize 
and identify common concepts, themes, events, examples, and topical markers 
such as names, organizations, or specific incidents.141  
Once all possible themes were identified, recurring themes were further 
narrowed to the most common themes that presented themselves across all 
three phases of the governance development process. This process allowed for 
each theme and concept to be extracted from the cumulative interview data and 
organized/combined for analysis. It also allowed for each theme and concept to 
be evaluated for its success or failure during each phase of the governance 
development process and to demonstrate how the themes and concepts evolved 
over time.   
Nine specific themes were derived from this iterative process and used to 
categorize the transcribed data: 
• Governance (Operational, Policy, Institutional) 
• Negotiation 
                                            
139 Richard E. Boyatzis, Transforming Qualitative Information: Thematic Analysis and Code 
Development, 1st ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications,1998), 31. 
140 Nigel King, Interviews in Qualitative Research (London: SAGE Publications, 2009), 152–
153. 
141 Rubin and Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing, 192. 
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• Strategic Vision 
• Conflict (Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument, Control, 
Communication) 
• Collaborative Capacity  
• Authority (Politics, Leadership) 
• Commonalities 
• Experience/Knowledge/Learning 
• Miscellaneous  
Under each theme, additional concepts were further defined to allow in-
depth analysis of the raw data. Concepts were coded from the transcribed audio 
and documented by phase (I, II, and III) in a spreadsheet format. Each coded unit 
was labeled with a coding key system that allowed the specific quote to be 
identified for the discussion and findings section. For example, the cell for phase 
I “Authority” has three data entries from two interviewees. The “GB1” refers to a 
specific participant, “P1” the page of the transcribed data, and “L24-26” the line 
numbers on the transcript. The wording is the researcher’s summary of the 
interviewee’s comment. An example of this process is provided in Table 2 to 
demonstrate the method used for data gathering.  
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Table 2.   Example Data Analysis 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the process that was used to identify themes 
related to governance process, negotiation, conflict, and collaboration. 
Additionally, it described the details about the interviews with the seven 
participants. Chapter IV will provide in-depth descriptions of the eight distinctive 
themes that emerged from the analysis.     
  
Coding 
Concept Phase I Phase II Phase III
Politics
GB2_P2_L30-31 (city manager asked to include 
others) GB2_P6_L13-15 (ultimatum from city managers 
- stopped process) GB2_P20_L16-19 (outside leaders 
stopped the process) DS_P7_L17-20 (management 
involvement led to breakdown) DS_P9_L4-7 (policy 
makers involved too late) CM_P6_L4-5 (no 
intermediary role) DF2_P3_L6-9 (dependent on others 
for information) BH_P15_L1-4 (external influences 
impacted process) BP_P9_L4-6 (need to involve 
higher level in process) DS_P11_L11 (ownership and 
control) CM_P4_L34-36 (lack of control led to concern) 
DF2_P1_L10-12 (ownership and equity) BH_P6_L10-
11 (finite resources) BP_P11_L4-7, 21-22 (too late to 
involve political bodies to salvage process) 
BP_P12_L4-5 (outside influences) SC_P5_L19-21 
(politics over control cause derailment) SC_P6_L22-23 
(politics influenced the outcome)
GB2_P11_L1-3 (success due to learning and change 
in leadership) GB2_P14_L29-31 (involvement of more 
political entities) GB2_P19_L12-13 (limited outside 
influence) DS_P14_L23 (strategic vision) 
DS_P21_L24-26 (no outside pressure) CM_P14_L36-
38 (need political support) DF2_P7_L33-35 (fire 
involvement) DF2_P24_L17 (diplomacy)
Authority
GB1_P1_L24-26 (limited decision-making authority) 
BP_P1_L25-28 (operational focus, limited authority) 
BP_P3_L5-8 (informal operational authority)
GB2_P3_L12-15 (operational personnel involved) 
GB2_P4_L8-11 (not appropriate level of authority to 
decide) GB2_P5_L34-36 (communication breakdown 
among participants with limited authority) CM_P6_L23-
25 (once it went bad, not high enough level 
participation) CM_P6_L31-32 (elevated after conflict 
arose) CM_P7_L12-13 (earlier intervention with higher 
levels) BH_P8_L16-19 (did not want to give up 
authority) BH_P9_L4-5 (different perspective/greater 
good) BP_P8_L3-5, 20-21 (committee was lower level - 
need to raise issues higher)
GB2_P11_L6-8 (group make-up higher level) 
GB2_P22_L11-16 (higher level policy-making process) 
DS_P10_L23-25 (higher level participation) 
DS_P20_L34-35 (appropriate level to move forward) 
DS_P26_L19-20 (right organizational buildup 
important) DF2_P9_L22-24 (higher level participation)  
DF2_P9_L32-25 (board level participants - decision 
makers) DF2_P11_L34-37 (higher level participation 
critical to success) DF2_P9_L22-24 (higher level 
participation) DF2_P9_L32-25 (board level 
participants - decision makers) DF2_P11_L34-37 
(higher level critical to success) DF2_P12_L8-10 
(executive level decision makers) DF2_P20_L28-29 
(choose participants carefully based on authority) 
BH_P12_L34-35 (decision-making authority) 
BH_P18_L30-32 (strategic players - no interest) 
BP_P17_L7-8 (higher level participation) BP_P17_18-
19 (bigger picture thinking) BP_P25_L29 (right people 
early in the process) BP_P26_L1-2 (decision makers 
needed) SC_P12_L25-27 (change in leadership 
impacted decision-making authority)
Leadership
DS_P9_L4-7 (policy makers involved too late) 
CM_P3_L5-7 (no manager level participation) 
CM_P7_L12-13 (earlier intervention with higher levels) 
DF2_P3_L6-9 (dependent on others for information) 
BP_P11_L4-7, 21-22 (too late to involve political 
bodies to salvage process)
GB2_P11_L1-3 (success due to learning and change 
in leadership) GB2_P11_L6-8 (group make-up higher 
level) GB2_P17_L17-18 (new leadership more 
positive) DS_P14_L23 (strategic vision) DS_P15_L4 
(champion for cause) CM_P8_26-28 (new leadership 
can provide new direction) CM_P9_L2-5 (positioning 
important) DF2_P6_L24-27 (champion) DF2_P9_L22-
24 (higher level participation)  DF2_P10_L11 (identify 
obstructions) DF2_P19_L4-5, 11 (commitment of 
leadership) BH_P10_L28-32 (role of visionary leader) 




IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the findings from seven individuals who were 
interviewed for this study. Once all interview audio was transcribed, coded, and 
analyzed, nine major themes emerged. This chapter presents the results of the 
thematic analysis along with a discussion that is grounded in the extant literature. 
Themes are grouped by categories related to the governance development 
process. The categories are: 
• Goals for Governance Development (governance, strategic vision, 
and commonalities) 
• Participant Characteristics (authority and experience/knowledge/ 
learning) 
• Organizational Collaborative Capacity 
• Processes (negotiation and conflict management) 
• Miscellaneous  
Each theme shows a progression over three phases in order to capture 
the developmental nature of the governance process. Appendix E provides a 
quick reference chart detailing the themes and actions within each phase. The 
three phases referenced in this case analysis are: 
• 1999–2004: Informal Governance Operations (Successful) 
• 2004–2008:  Formalized Governance Development (Unsuccessful) 
• 2008–Current: Formalized Governance Development (Successful) 




Figure 5.  Progression of Events over the Three Phases 
1999
• Phoenix and Mesa establish a partnership to design, build, and implement a wireless 
communications network
• All other regional cities opt to not join the network
2003
• Phoenix and Mesa begin operations on the unified system with no formalized governance 
process in place
2004
• The City of Tempe expresses an interest in potentially joining the network
• Phoenix and Mesa form a governance working group to begin the process of developing a 
formal governance system
2005
• Phoenix and Tempe are awarded a 2005 COPS Interoperable Technology Grant to enable 
Tempe to  join the network
2005-2007
• Ongoing governance development process discussions between Phoenix and Mesa. Tempe 
begins to participate in the process in a limited capacity. The City of Scottsdale is also 
expressing interest in joining the wireless network. 
2007
• Phoenix City Manager sends a letter to Mesa advising them of the intent to discontinue 
discussions and move forward without Mesa if they cannot agree to the existing terms of the 
draft agreement
• Mesa City Manager responds that Mesa will move ahead with their own governance system and 
the networks will be separated
2008
• Phoenix and Mesa separate the networks to operate independently with two distinct systems
• Mesa establishes the TOPAZ Regional Wireless Cooperative with the cities of Mesa, Gilbert, 
Apache Junction, and Queen Creek
• Phoenix establishes the Regional Wireless Cooperative with Phoenix, Tempe, Scottsdale, 
Chandler, Peoria, Avondale, Goodyear, Surprise, El Mirage, Sun City, Sun City West, and  Sun 
Lakes
2008-2012
• The TRWC and RWC both develop their own goverance agreement documents. The documents 
are operationally focused, but do have some policy-level processes established that allow each 
independent cooperative to function and meet the needs of their respective members. 
2012
• The RWC and TRWC hold a joint board of directors meeting where there is agreement that 
governance development efforts should be reinitiated to attempt to unify the two separate 
networks under a single governance structure
2012-2015
• A governance working group is established with executive members from both the TRWC and 
RWC comprising Phoenix, Scottsdale, El Mirage, Peoria, Mesa, and Rio Verde Fire District
• The working group meets regularly to develop guiding principles, mission, and vision statements 
and develop a unified governance document for consideration by both boards of directors
2015-2017
• Efforts to unify the system are scheduled pending technical review and final  adoption of a single 
unified governance system
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B. GOALS FOR GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT 
Governance development processes must establish effective goals for 
success. Achieving these objectives increases the opportunities for the 
development of a comprehensive governance process. During the analysis of the 
data from the interview participants, three distinct goals emerged that are 
attributed to success: governance processes, the establishment of a strategic 
vision, and a focus on commonalities.  
1. Governance 
Governance seeks to achieve direction, control, and coordination of 
individuals or organizations through the establishment of processes and 
objectives. In the public sector, governance strives to develop procedures and 
policies, and to institutionalize processes and relationships. Throughout the 
analysis of the data, these distinct objectives became evident as the participants 
and organizations evolved from an operational focus to institutionalization 
throughout the course of the three phases.  
a. Results 
In phase I of the governance development process, interview participants 
noted that the level of participation in the governance discussions was heavily 
focused on operational issues. Most of the individuals assigned to the team had 
technical backgrounds and were the same individuals who created the initial 
network design and conducted operations of the day-to-day telecommunications 
system.  
In phase I, no formal governance structure existed. In other words, no 
formal policies or procedures were promulgated. Instead, team members focused 
on building consensus around the technical and operational aspects of the 
system. In this phase, technical teams would make and receive phone calls, 
have impromptu meetings, or resolve issues that arose amongst the technical 
staff who were tasked with keeping the system operational. If conflict arose, the 
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individuals would work to reach consensus absent any established formalized 
decision-making process.  
Participant F summarized this process: the parties would “just call each 
other up when we needed to or when we had meetings to discuss issues.”142 
Participant D characterized this as operating under a “handshake deal” rather 
than a formalized structure or clearly defined organizational process.143 During 
phase I, only the City of Phoenix and the City of Mesa were partners. Later in 
phase I, a few smaller participants were added, but Phoenix and Mesa continued 
to manage the system under an informal governance arrangement.  
In early phase II, additional participants included the cities of Gilbert and 
Queen Creek, and the Apache Junction Fire District. As additional cities such as 
Tempe, Scottsdale, and Peoria sought to join the network, formalized 
governance discussions began to establish a codification of the process and 
provide structure to the organization that had been operating under the informal 
arrangement between the original two partners (Phoenix and Mesa). The addition 
of new partners provided the transition to move to phase II of the governance 
development process.  
In phase II, there continued to be an emphasis on the operational aspects 
of managing the communications system. The second phase exhibited some 
aspects of strategic and policy processes being implemented, but discussions 
often continued to revolve around simply producing a document with an 
emphasis on solving operational concerns and not on long-term processes or 
formalized institutionalization of the system.  
Participant A stated that the goal given to him in phase II was to take the 
existing process and “form it into a working document we could adopt and move 
on with.”144 There was a belief that the process would simply document the 
                                            
142 Interview with Participant F, November 26, 2014. 
143 Interview with Participant D, November 18, 2014. 
144 Interview with Participant A, November 17, 2014. 
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existing practices and allow the process to move forward quickly with 
establishing a governance structure that would provide operational guidance and 
basic structure for the network. The expectation was for a higher-level product, 
but the participants in phase II were not the appropriate individuals to accomplish 
the objective.  
Participant A also noted that phase I and early phase II were built on a 
platform of trust and cooperation, which allowed significant attention to be placed 
on solving technical and operational issues early in the process.145 A noteworthy 
product of the early phases was a comprehensive operational document that 
formed the basis for later governance discussions. In the later stages of phase II, 
however, when the discussion began to focus on structural governance 
processes and policy discussions, progress began to falter. Participant A noted 
there were three distinct issues that led to this breakdown: ownership of radio 
frequencies, property ownership for communications network infrastructure, and 
the distribution of voting rights (i.e., authority and control).146 These three issues 
highlighted a lack of consensus on specific rules, decision-making processes, 
and conflict resolution mechanisms.  
After the governance development process failed in the latter stages of 
phase II, there was a lapse in time where the two systems operated 
independently, with each establishing its own cooperatives and autonomous 
governance systems. The Phoenix Regional Wireless Cooperative (RWC) 
established governance with the cities of Phoenix, Tempe, and Scottsdale, as 
well as several smaller fire districts, comprising the governing body. The Mesa 
Trunked Open Arizona Network (TOPAZ) established itself with the cities of 
Mesa, Gilbert, and Queen Creek, as well as the Apache Junction Fire District. 
Both separate networks, however, still felt a need to develop a single 
comprehensive governance development process despite reaching an earlier 
                                            
145 Interview with Participant A, November 17, 2014.  
146 Ibid.  
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impasse. The driver was primarily to establish a regionally integrated system with 
the appropriate governance mechanism to support the unified system.  
Phase III was initiated by the desire to have both networks consolidated 
under a single governance structure. The governing bodies of the RWC and 
TRWC met and collectively agreed that an effort be initiated to discuss the 
merging of the two disparate systems to achieve greater efficiencies and 
resource utilization within the region. At the beginning of phase III, the RWC 
included 20 member organizations and TOPAZ comprised six member 
organizations.  
As phase III began, participation was marked by high-level decision 
makers engaged in the governance development process. The teams involved in 
this phase were comprised of policy makers who had significant authority to 
make binding decisions on behalf of their respective agencies. Operational-level 
personnel were used as subject matter experts for input, but were no longer the 
primary participants in the process.  
Participant G noted that the policy-making individuals had greater 
experience at governance development and were able to draw upon other 
collective experiences in their executive roles to address governance concerns 
that arose.147 Throughout the operation of the separate systems, several of the 
earlier issues such as ownership of frequencies and retaining infrastructure (real 
property) had been resolved. The earlier issues that were not resolved prior to 
the impasse were now no longer issues since they had been resolved by each of 
the individual governance bodies throughout the course of their operations. 
Control and voting structure, however, was defined in each separate governance 
system, but control and voting structures were still critical topics between the 
RWC and TRWC that had yet to be resolved to allow a seamless integration of 
the two bodies.  
                                            
147 Interview with Participant G, December 11, 2014. 
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Because the more senior governance team members did not have 
operational responsibilities, they were able to focus on policy-level decisions, 
unlike the earlier operational participants who were directly involved with 
decisions that could personally and professionally impact them.148 Participant F 
noted that in earlier phases, the personal stake in the direct outcome limited 
those engaged in the process and prevented participants from compromising or 
changing positions due to their day-to-day functions potentially being eliminated 
should a successful governance process be established.149 
Because policy making became the focus for phase III, this shifted the 
emphasis to the institutionalization and codification of the governance 
development process. With top-level officials engaged in the process, it was 
possible to address issues of authority and establish a formalized 
intergovernmental agreement. Rather than simply focus on producing an 
operational document to direct functional or policy-level operations, the 
importance shifted to institutionalization. This effort sought to formalize the 
governance structure while reducing operational-level guidance in the process. 
The focus in phase III was to establish institutionalized structures and processes 
that would allow operational guidance to be developed outside of the governance 
process to be more effective at separating the governance structure from day-to-
day operations.  
The early documentation produced from phases I and II was specific as to 
operational and technical processes and procedures, with a narrow concentration 
on policy or structure. The shift to institutionalization moved the focus to strategic 
concepts detailing higher-level processes that specified how partnerships would 
be established, managed, and maintained, not specifically how a 
communications system should operate technically or operationally.  
                                            




Governance is defined as “the means for achieving direction, control, and 
coordination of individuals and organizations with varying degrees of autonomy in 
order to advance joint objectives.”150 Governance is more than just the institution 
of a process; it is a mechanism by which objectives are specified and advanced 
by all parties involved.  
In phase I, the participants were concentrated on operating a wireless 
system and successfully functioned using an informal structure with no specific 
guidance or direction. This was successful when the objective was solely service 
delivery and not policy development. The limited established policy allowed for 
the process to work well, despite individuals with limited decision-making 
authority assigned the task of governance development.  
Attention was directed at the operation of the network. The concentration 
was not on advancing any specific objectives, but on keeping the system 
operational. This operational-level participation offered individuals the ability to 
work in an informal manner and address operational concerns quickly and 
effectively. The processes described in phase I are consistent with Imperial’s 
LCAF model at level one.151 Imperial described this level as one where line-level 
personnel work with counterparts on projects or initiatives to get them 
established and functional. Routinely at this level, the participants are not 
operating under any formalized structure or system. Rather, they are 
collaborating to achieve a goal or objective, which is usually some type of service 
delivery or other deliverable.  
In phase II, the shift to formalizing the policy development process 
occurred. By leaving existing operational personnel in place as the chief decision 
makers, however, the process reached impasse and discussions ceased. While 
                                            
150 Imperial and Kauneckis, “Moving from Conflict to Collaboration,” 1011.. 
151 Imperial, “Using Collaboration as a Governance Strategy,” 288. 
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there was an effort to engage higher-level policy makers in phase II, the addition 
of this level of participant occurred too late in the process to achieve success.  
Additionally, the phase II focus remained largely on operational aspects of 
governance and did not evolve to the second level of joint action defined in 
Imperial’s LCAF.152 Imperial defined the second level as the place where 
midlevel administrators negotiate policies, but do not focus on strategic levels of 
decision making.153 Phase II would have been able to achieve this second level 
had higher-level administrators been involved earlier in the process to negotiate 
policies specifically directed at higher-level structure versus operational structure. 
This movement towards Imperial’s second level of the LCAF began to exhibit 
itself in phase II, but occurred later in the phase after relationships and 
negotiations were at already seemingly insolvent stages.   
Strategic levels of governance seek to formalize and institutionalize 
shared guidelines and norms that direct the operational and policy levels. In 
phase III, participation was elevated to the executive level. This led to a shift in 
focus to institutionalizing processes and formalizing rules, decision-making 
processes, and conflict resolution mechanisms. The evolution from operational 
and policy-level processes to institutional levels following the LCAF also allowed 
the governance process to become less reliant on individuals and personal 
relationships, as occurred in earlier phases.  
While individuals and relationships are important to collaborative 
processes, to reach institutional levels the process must evolve to focus on 
codification and less on operations.154 As the parties involved in phase III 
codified their mission, vison, and objectives, they moved from strictly operations 
and policy development to institutionalization. The development of a single 
governance system from two separate systems was a critical step in the 
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institutionalization process based on a shared set of objectives to advance the 
process, consistent with Imperial’s framework.  
Imperial stated that developing any new organization and creating 
collaborative organizations present similar challenges. Collaborative 
organizations are typically the product of a series of efforts at the operational and 
policy-making levels.155 Before an organization can reach a collaborative state, 
time and effort must be spent building relationships and trust, which are 
important steps to joint action. This occurred in phases I and II to a limited extent 
but was enhanced in phase III, leading to greater success.  
Additionally, public managers need to maximize their learning 
opportunities and allow sufficient time to gradually scale up and expand 
collaborative efforts.156 Based on the evolution of the phases and consistent with 
Imperial’s findings in his study, this case suggests that some engagement at all 
of the various phases (operational, policy-making, institutionalization) is required 
to reach a fully collaborative state. What is unclear is if all three of these steps 
are necessary to reach a fully collaborative state. In this case analysis, elements 
of all three were present across all phases, but it is undetermined if the 
sequential nature of each phase is necessary for success. It may be possible for 
all three levels of the framework to be addressed simultaneously rather than 
sequentially.  
The phases are also consistent with Bardach’s emergence phenomenon, 
which finds that collaborative efforts at one level commonly lead directly or 
indirectly to activities at other levels.157 Bardach refers to this as the momentum 
process. As the collaborative governance process evolves, a series of changes 
occur that influences each level of the process.158 
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These changes include increasing enthusiasm. While interest grows, a 
small network of advocates emerges and infects others with enthusiasm, 
heightens expectations, and elicits additional resources. Bandwagon effects 
occur. As the process emerges and appears to be achieving success, more 
resources are attracted. Consensus and trust also cultivate. When more 
individuals reach consensus, it becomes easier for outside individuals to be 
influenced and participate. In addition, interpersonal trust grows with experience, 
becomes a means for expanding the circle of trust, and creates the 
communications capacity and the social capital to expand and continue to 
achieve successful outcomes.159 This gives these processes an evolutionary or 
emergent character. Governance develops over time and the progression of this 
case across the three phases is consistent with Imperial and Bardach’s models 
on governance.  
2. Strategic Vision 
A strategic vision articulates the long-term objectives for an organization. 
A vision may be established to bring about comprehensive change and shift from 
previous interests to new ones. An effective strategic vision enables 
organizations to develop specific objectives to meet the established vision. In this 
case study, the strategic vision came late in the governance development 
process and encouraged the effort to move the concentration from strictly an 
operational focus to strategic efforts in the governance development process. 
a. Results 
In phase I, the agencies involved in the operation of the system were 
initially concerned with ensuring the successful technical operation of the 
communications network. The early participants were specifically directed to 
ensure the system was operational and met the needs of the public safety users. 
The initial mission was to ensure that the system was built and operated at public 
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safety standards. While the focus was on public safety, there was no defined or 
expressly published mission statement, guiding principles, or vision statement in 
either phase I or phase II. Participant F stated the people involved were aware of 
a need to think strategically in phase I and early phase II, but at the time, “that 
really wasn’t our concern.”160 
The cities of Mesa and Phoenix were not concerned with long-term 
strategy or developing strategic plans until the city of Tempe showed an interest 
in joining the network. Once the network began to expand with the addition of 
new members, it became clear that a more structured and formalized 
governance process would be required. Participant A noted that the informal 
process “would never survive” if there was not a vision to develop a more 
comprehensive governance process with more than just a few partners.161  
During phase II, participants began thinking at the strategic level, but there 
was still not a clear vision of the desired long-term outcome of the governance 
development process. In addition to a lack of a strategic vision, there was also 
limited direction on what was to be accomplished specifically in terms of a final 
team deliverable. The goal in phase II was focused on completing the assigned 
task of quickly producing a governance document that was still substantially 
operational in nature to accommodate new potential members.  
This goal led to conflict between agency interests and these concerns 
drove participant priorities more than the needs of public safety. In phase I, there 
was clearly a focus on ensuring public safety needs were met first. In phase II, 
however, participants moved away from a focus on public safety and moved 
towards a focus on individual agency needs such as the protection of assets and 
resources. As discussions began to focus on control and assets, the 
conversations about putting public safety needs first became subordinate.  
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Despite the system in phase I providing exceptional interoperability, as the 
process broke down and reached impasse, the ability for public safety 
responders to have seamless interoperability ceased to exist as it had before. 
This compromised the original focus of public safety as the priority. At the end of 
phase II when the process reached impasse, Phoenix and Mesa independently 
completed their respective governance documents to establish methods of 
control and asset protection of the now two separate systems.162 
The strategic-level focus of phase III was evident before discussions were 
initiated. Once the governance working group was appointed by executive 
leadership, the team immediately began work on a set of guiding principles, 
mission statement, and strategic vision statement over the course of several 
meetings. The development of these materials was time consuming, but was met 
with positive reaction among participants and became a tool for consensus 
building. The resulting document focused entirely on developing these strategic 
guidance materials before any conversations concerning governance began. 
Participant E stated about this document that, “it really was the pinning or the 
foundation of what we were trying to achieve and what rules of engagement we 
would use.”163 
This document provided the basis for the desired long-term outcomes 
from the governance development process in phase III. Participant E supplied a 
copy of the final document during his interview. Figure 6 is a copy of the guiding 
principles, mission, and vision statement established by the team. 
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Figure 6.  Guiding Principles, Mission & Vision Statement164 
Participant E stated that having this document as the first page of every 
meeting agenda guided the strategic vision of the group and provided a 
persistent reminder of their responsibility. He stated, “it breaks down all of the 
competitiveness and it breaks down what we are trying to achieve and why are 
we really looking to do this, and it really helps to be a catalyst for pulling people 
together and understanding there is a reason for doing this.”165  
Participant A was involved in all phases of this process and noted his 
experience from phase I to phase III: “I believe we had a mission [in phase I], we 
didn’t have any guiding principles. We didn’t spend nearly as much time up front 
on those last time [phases I and II] as we did this time [phase III]. I believe it 
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Guiding Principles – Agreed upon ideals that the group will keep in mind when 
making all decisions, to ensure we are focused on achieving our ultimate goal 
Provide Valley-wide operable & interoperable communication services which are 
focused on the operational needs of the end user – universal “push to talk” 
coverage should be our overarching goal 
 Maximize use of all existing resources including financial and personnel 
 Establish and maintain system compatibility which is sustainable over 
time 
 Focus on the needs of the end users which includes both first 
responders and the public 
 
Mission & Vision Statements 
 Mission:  
To achieve excellence in radio and data communications supporting 
public safety and municipal partners. 
 Vision:  
To assure seamless radio and data communications to meet the 




helps.”166 Participant A felt that while having a mission was important, the 
guiding principles established the framework by which to operate and provides 
the vision for the participants to achieve. This was missing from phases I and II, 
but once established in phase III he felt it helped the process attain more 
success and remain focused on what they were ultimately seeking to achieve.   
In phase III, when the governance working group provided updates to 
senior officials and stakeholders, they would ensure their strategic vision was 
shared on every document to stress the importance of the vision in their process. 
Additionally, in phase III, the emphasis was once again returned to ensuring that 
public safety needs were met first and agency-specific desires secondary. The 
guiding principles, mission, and vision were designed to keep the focus on the 
requirements of first responders. As the team developed their guiding principles, 
mission, and vision statement, they focused entirely on the needs of public safety 
first in all of their discussions and negotiations. They also viewed the citizens as 
their end users of the system, not only public safety. Their concentration was on 
ensuring that all stakeholder interests were met and remained the principal focus 
of the process.  
On several occasions, the governance team in phase III would refer back 
to this document when a member felt the discussion or governance process was 
losing focus. Participant E, who is the chair of the governance team in phase III, 
reiterated that on several occasions the vision was putting public safety and the 
citizenry first. He stated that in their discussions, “it [the partnership] might be 
more expensive potentially, but that’s the right thing to do [mitigate potential risks 
to public safety].”167  
b. Discussion 
The creation or implementation of a strategic vision or mission statement 
provides a useful tool for accountability, ensures results for the organization, and 
                                            
166 Interview with Participant A, November 17, 2014. 
167 Interview with Participant E, November 25, 2014. 
 56 
encourages developing partnerships.168 The participants in phase III realized the 
value of ensuring that a strategic vision was clearly documented before any 
discussions occurred or conflict arose. This material established the baseline on 
which the process would operate and defined the rules of engagement. Several 
of the participants in phase III noted that when discussions would become mired 
in trivial discussion or conflict occurred over unsubstantial issues, they would 
refer back to the guiding principles to ensure accountability and refocus their 
efforts.  
The strategic vision should always be at the forefront of all discussions, 
processes, and communications when planting new ventures.169 This sharing of 
a strategic vision ensures that organizational shift will occur and achieve 
success.170 The data above from phase III shows that the team working the 
governance development process established a common vision and championed 
the cause that met the desired outcome for elected and senior officials. Once the 
group in phase III shared the strategic vision and routinely communicated that 
vision, their efforts garnered the support and organizational change needed to 
move from an unsuccessful to a successful governance development process.   
3. Commonalities 
As parties emphasize differences, they focus on the issues that are the 
source of conflict between their organizations. A focus on differences allows for 
disagreement to become the center of the discussions rather than seeking to 
understand commonalities. When the parties seek to understand the 
commonalities and minimize the differences, they are able to better understand 
the other’s needs and objectives. A shift in the frame of reference allows the 
governance development process to succeed by emphasizing commonalities and 
minimizing differences to allow for the search for solutions that meet the needs 
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and objectives of all parties. This focus on commonalities also shifts the 
interaction from a competitive process to a more collaborative mindset. 
a. Results 
Phase I was characterized by a mutual agreement of the two parties to 
operate a unified communications network. When participants began the process 
of formalizing the governance development process in phase II, there was initial 
agreement on mutual interests in commonalities between the two parties. Both 
parties shared a common focus of providing exceptional public safety radio 
network coverage, an effort to avoid duplication of effort by sharing network 
infrastructure, and maximization of staff resources to minimize the cost of 
personnel for both entities. As the process began to deteriorate and conflict 
escalated, however, the parties began to focus on differences between the 
groups rather than attention to commonalities.  
When focus shifted to issues like voting rights and control (authorities), 
conflict increased. Parties focused extensively on their differences, which led to 
further disagreement on how to address those dissimilarities. Participant E stated 
“it was obvious that they [the parties] worked very hard together on things and 
they got to a certain point and then they had a divorce.”171 As the parties 
reached a point where there was exclusive attention on the differences, the 
process reached impasse.  
Participant F put this into context by stating, “this governance group in 
phase II was really focusing on these three differences [ownership of 
frequencies, ownership of real property, and voting structure] that were deal 
breakers, whereas this group [in phase III] is like there’s 25 things we agree on 
and there are three things we don’t agree on, maybe we should start with those 
[that we agree on]?”172 As participant F noted, as the process migrated from 
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phase II to phase III the attention of the group shifted from an emphasis on 
differences to a concentration on what is common between the parties.  
Phase III was characterized by emphasizing those areas where there was 
agreement initially to reach early success and mutual agreement before attention 
shifted to the differences. In phase III, there were two separate governance 
documents that the parties were attempting to consolidate.173 The parties 
involved in phase III began by comparing the two documents for similarity and 
documenting how close they were to each other.  
As participant F stated, there were a substantial number of commonalities 
between the two parties and relatively few differences. Rather than spend a 
considerable amount of time on those areas where there were commonalities, 
the parties were able to reach early consensus on a majority of the issues and 
then apply their time and efforts to those where there were differences.  
Participant A mentioned the shift in approach from phase II to phase III 
stating “the first time around was, ‘there are differences—these are where we 
can’t agree and we’re not going to agree’ versus the process now where we’re 
focusing on commonalities and trying to put those pieces together.”174 In addition 
to the commonalities in the governance process, the parties also recognized they 
had commonalities in operational aspects. Participant G stated, “If we’re having 
the same issues, then why can’t we work together and try to pull this thing back 
together?”175 As the commonalities were emphasized in the governance 
development process and operational aspects, the parties were able to move 
forward with the process to achieve success.  
Additionally, time has been a factor in allowing both parties to observe that 
they are operating in a comparable fashion to each other, despite the significant 
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disagreements in phase II over control and authority. Participant F stated, 
“They’ve [TRWC] had time to actually see our [RWC] behavior, so maybe that 
level of trust has increased some so that, you know, immediately after 
implementation [meaning after the RWC governance system was implemented] it 
was scary, whereas now maybe it’s not so scary.”176 Time has been helpful with 
providing awareness on commonalities and diminishing differences. 
b. Discussion 
Participants in a process must sustain a free flow of information and 
understand each other’s needs and objectives. In order to achieve this, 
participants may need to use a different frame of reference.177 Participants in a 
governance development process may achieve this level of reference or clarity 
by emphasizing the commonalities between the parties and minimizing the 
differences.  
Identifying and emphasizing commonalities may also help parties 
understand and satisfy each other’s interests. Identifying interests is a critical 
step in the process of integrative bargaining. Interests are the underlying 
concerns, needs, desires, or fears that motivate a party to take a particular 
position.178 Fisher, Ury, and Patton stressed that understanding each other’s 
interests will permit the parties to invent solutions that meet each other’s 
interests.179  
Phase II was characterized by the parties focusing on the differences 
between the groups that led to conflict and disagreement over how to best 
resolve them. This focus on disagreement limited the ability of the parties to 
clearly identify those interests and work to address them. In phase III, the parties 
began their process by seeking to understand where the commonalities existed 
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between the parties before identifying differences. This initial review began the 
process by demonstrating to the parties how closely aligned they were in terms 
of interests and how few barriers actually existed to successfully address each 
other’s needs.  
The effort to identify commonalities also led to a more complete 
understanding of interests. As the interests were identified, the parties involved in 
the process were able to invent solutions and reach consensus on those issues 
to satisfy each party. Without the clear identification of interests, the focus may 
have easily reverted to differences, which would have led to similar 
circumstances that exhibited themselves in phase II.  
The parties also understood the value of joint action. As identified in phase 
III, the parties had similar operational concerns that could also be addressed by 
this consolidation process. Time and experience had also demonstrated the 
commonalities between the two entities. Public value is increased by the parties 
doing things together instead of doing them alone.180 This was another interest 
the parties identified that maintained a focus on commonalities. By stressing the 
greater goal of achieving a successful governance development process, the 
parties were able to maintain a focus on commonalities that eventually led to 
agreement and solutions, rather than conflict and process breakdown, which 
occurred in earlier phases.181  
C. PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS 
Throughout the course of the study, several characteristics of the 
participants emerged as important success factors. Participants in the 
governance development process needed to have the appropriate authority to 
engage in the process and have proper decision-making authority to make 
binding agreements. Additionally, a level of experience, knowledge, and 
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organizational learning was a critical component for the participants to acquire to 
move from unsuccessful to successful governance development. 
1. Authority 
When the focus of an initiative is operationally based or strictly service 
delivery, high-level decision-making authority may not be required. As 
governance development processes become increasingly complex and shift from 
operations to policy making, however, participants must be granted sufficient 
authority to make organizational-level decisions. Engaging higher-level 
authorities also ensures that the appropriate direction is established to guide the 
governance development process. It also enables more effective discussions to 
occur directly, without the engagement of multiple levels of personnel involved in 
the process that may not be appropriate for high-level discussions.  
a. Results 
Participants in phase I were given informal operational authority. They 
were able to make decisions related to how the system would operate and make 
the necessary changes. They were not given, however, authority to make policy 
or administratively binding decisions. Participant A discussed the differences 
from phase I to phase III: “The level of participants was probably a step down 
from what it is today.”182 
Phase II began by including additional members who had more authority 
to make decisions on behalf of their organization but not of an appropriate 
authority level to make binding agreements on behalf of jurisdictions or cities. 
While issues of ownership and control continued to be controversial topics, a 
communications breakdown occurred between the participants in this phase. 
Participant A noted some of the successes in phase II. He stated, “while the 
negotiations and putting together the governance language went very well and 
we certainly had capable people, but there wasn’t anybody in the room doing that 
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that had the authority to make those decisions.”183 The contentious topics 
involved the relinquishment of some authority on behalf of organizations that 
were beyond the scope of many of the participants in the process. This authority 
was viewed as a finite resource that became a highly debatable topic among the 
governance team in phase II.  
When these individuals attempted to engage their senior leaders and 
policy makers, they realized that the engagement occurred too late in the 
process. As policy makers were brought into the decision-making process, they 
were asked to make decisions based on limited knowledge and with very little 
context as to how the issue had escalated to its current state. Interviewees 
commented that the decisions being made by executive-level personnel late in 
the process were done without the full operational impact of the decision being 
realized. 
The late intervention in phase II by those with sufficient authority to make 
binding decisions ultimately resulted in impasse in the discussions. Controversial 
letters (referred to by some as “ultimatums”) were exchanged between the City of 
Phoenix and the City of Mesa. See Appendix C and D for copies of these letters 
issued by the management of each entity. As Participant F noted, the 
involvement of senior officials later in the process seemed helpful initially, but 
eventually led to impasse. He stated, “So you’d get the high-level folks together 
and everybody would leave and it would seem that we had reached an 
agreement, but it never happened and that’s why the ‘letter,’ the ‘ultimatum,’ as it 
is called finally came out.”184 
In phase III, the agencies appointed senior-level policy makers to staff the 
governance working group to develop a single comprehensive governance 
process. Operational-level personnel were used in the process, but only as 
subject matter experts or for informational guidance rather than being put in an 
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authoritative role or decision-making policy role. Executive leaders engaged in 
phase III set the tone for the process and had sufficient authority to make binding 
decisions on behalf of their respective organizations. This level of authority 
allowed the participants to achieve successful outcomes based on their ability to 
make immediate decisions without having to confer with senior leaders, 
improving the efficiency of the process. Several participants noted the need to 
engage those with appropriate authority early in the process. Participant F stated, 
“Get the right people involved up front at the right level.”185 Additionally, authority 
was viewed as something that could be shared amongst all participants rather 
than a finite resource that was a cause of disagreement in earlier phases.  
Finally, a champion or group of champions was needed to move this 
process forward. The individuals engaged in phase III were from diverse 
backgrounds and with extensive authority and experience to move the process 
forward. An executive with appropriate authority was needed to drive the 
process. A city manager involved in the process noted, “I’m not going to tell you 
how to do it, but I’m going to tell you what the outcome ought to look like and you 
figure out [what] the best path to get there is and that’s just the way I do 
business.”186 The executive leadership set the tone for the process and 
established the appropriate team to lead the governance development process 
and champion the direction for achieving success.  
b. Discussion 
In phase I, participants were provided with the authority to make 
operational and technical decisions. This operational authority was limited to 
those aspects of system operation but did not include any authority to make or 
implement policy. At the time, the limited authority was not a hindrance to the 
process since most of the decisions did not involve policy-level issues.  
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Once the process evolved to attempting to formalize the governance 
development process, retaining the same level of participation in the process 
provided insufficient to allow policy decisions to be made and developed. As 
Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas discussed in their Inter-Organizational 
Collaborative Capacity (ICC) Model, insufficient authority from participants and a 
lack of formal roles or procedures for managing collaboration are detrimental to 
the collaborative process.187 In phase II, the participants did not have the 
authority to make binding decisions, which became a barrier to success.  
The participants in phase II realized that the issues and concerns that 
became contentious discussion points needed to be elevated to a higher-level 
authority for resolution. When these policy makers were brought into the process, 
they were only given narrow information on which to base their decisions. This 
limited engagement late in the process resulted in a series of letters being sent 
between city managers that led to impasse and dissolution of the process. 
Additionally, these letters later became the basis for many years of damaged 
relationships and limited communication and information sharing between the 
two parties (distrust). This is detailed under Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’ 
lateral mechanisms of their ICC Model as a barrier factor that limits 
interorganizational collaboration, as occurred in this case.188  
Once sufficient authority was established and engaged in phase III, the 
governance development process began to experience a series of successes 
due this level of involvement. Operational personnel were utilized as needed, but 
were not given the sole responsibility for decision making beyond their scope. 
This executive leadership established the appropriate environment to foster 
interorganizational collaboration by establishing the appropriate authority of 
participants, effective communications and information exchange, and 
appropriate leadership support and commitment from top-level executives. Many 
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exchange mechanisms tend to be social and based on relationships. Formal 
authority, however, is necessary to allow effective and successful decision 
making to occur in the process.189 This support has fostered increased 
collaboration and a successful governance development process with 
appropriate authority engaged for decision making. 
2. Experience/Knowledge/Learning 
Participants from an operational background were initially the primary 
parties involved in the governance development process. Their experience and 
knowledge of policy-making processes was limited and affected their ability to 
successfully complete the effort. As individuals with more experience and 
knowledge were engaged in the process, the efforts were more successful. 
Additionally, having historical knowledge of the prior efforts allowed for the 
organization and individuals to learn from prior efforts to capitalize on both 
success and failure in the later phase to produce positive results. 
a. Results 
In phase I, the participants involved in the governance development 
process were from highly technical and operational backgrounds. Their 
experience and knowledge was primarily concentrated on the design, building, 
implementation, and operation of the wireless communications network. The 
participants in phase I had extensive public administration experience, but most 
were not specifically trained or knowledgeable with high-level policy making.  
In phase II, many of those same participants engaged in the governance 
development process. The only experience they had to draw upon was their prior 
efforts, which were informal and offered little practical experience or knowledge. 
During phase II, a consultant was brought in as an objective third party to attempt 
to provide some direction and guidance in the governance development process. 
The consultant had extensive experience with several communications 
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technology projects across the nation. They had been used earlier in the design, 
development, and implementation of the system. Their skillset, however, was 
more specifically focused on project management and technical guidance, not 
necessarily governance development processes.190 
The consultant did seek out other governance systems and offered 
information during phase II as to what models might be emulated or further 
examined for consideration. Despite the availability of other models from across 
the nation, the situation in this region was so unique that no single model could 
be easily applied and matched, which complicated the process. Additionally, 
some of the new participants involved in the formalization of the governance 
development process in phase II were of a higher-level role and had some 
additional limited experience with negotiations and other similar governance 
processes, which was helpful.  
Participants interviewed noted that while experience was limited among 
the participants, there was a learning process that occurred during the years of 
discussion that provided some support in the process. Participant A stated that 
the process was “a learning process” and “there was a learning element” that 
occurred in this phase.191 In phase II, the City of Mesa brought in a member of 
the city’s water department who had prior experience with another governance 
initiative in the region to offer some assistance. The support provided related to 
governance structure, procedures, protocols, and operational processes. The 
effort was to assist the group in phase II with overcoming some of their 
contentious issues by analyzing how another governance initiative successfully 
addressed them. This participation by a third party was described as “very 
helpful” with using outside experience and knowledge to help further the process 
during phase II.192 While phase II resulted in a failure of the process, this 
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additional engagement by experienced parties was viewed as helpful and 
beneficial to the process, despite the result.  
Phase III was characterized by advances in the evolution of the 
governance development process due to the experience of the participants 
selected to lead the process. The prior knowledge and experience from the past 
phases was a critical factor in allowing the process to advance more quickly. 
Participant G stated having “that knowledge of that [the prior phases] has helped 
us move a little bit quicker through the process.”193 He also stated that the 
knowledge and experience in this phase had “to be learned, earned, and, you 
know, ultimately developed through the process.”194 
While having more experienced professionals assigned to the team 
handling the governance development process is critical to the success, 
participants noted that time has also been beneficial to the process. The passage 
of time has been advantageous to allow all parties to gain additional knowledge 
and experience, but it also allowed trust to increase. Participant F noted on the 
process, “They’ve had time to actually see our behavior, so maybe that level of 
trust has increased some.”195 Several participants stated that time has allowed 
the level of knowledge to increase and prior experiences to help guide the 
actions of the team engaged in phase III.  
Some of the interviewees felt that a level of failure needed to occur to 
establish a path for success in future efforts. Participant A claimed, “Some of that 
process needed to occur [prior efforts, failures, etc.].” In addition, “the failure that 
happened here I believe was a learning experience.”196 As a member of the 
governance development team in phase III, one of the participants said, “I think 
progress would be stifled if we didn’t learn from our experiences. I think progress 
would be hard to come by if we didn’t use history to help guide us for the 
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future.”197 The governance team in phase III initially reviewed the prior efforts of 
phase I and II to ascertain what mistakes led to dissention to either avoid those 
same faults, or make concerted efforts to ensure that they were properly 
addressed moving forward. It is not clear from the participants if the mistakes had 
to occur to achieve success in phase III. The interviewees, however, 
acknowledged that by taking time to review and learn from them they were able 
to capitalize on them and progress forward more rapidly and successfully. 
b. Discussion 
Phase I participants were not experienced enough to make high-level 
policy decisions required as part of developing a comprehensive governance 
process. During this phase, however, that level of knowledge or experience was 
not required. The focus at the time was operational and technical, not policy. 
Once the process evolved to phase II where the objective was development of 
formalized governance processes and documentation, the value of having 
knowledgeable and experienced participants was more critical. Phase I was not 
particularly helpful with developing extensive prior experience for the participants, 
yet those same individuals were tasked with participating in the efforts of phase 
II. As the process progressed in phase II, participants found value by adding 
personnel with supplementary knowledge and experience. The third parties 
added to the process focused on providing specific expertise.  
The hired consultant provided comparative analysis on structure and 
operations of other similar governance processes from across the nation. The 
water department representative brought expertise regarding how their prior 
governance processes addressed structure, procedures, protocols, and 
operational processes. The efforts of both a consultant and third party with 
relevant experience to provide an external perspective were beneficial to closing 
the knowledge gap that existed with the team when they began discussions in 
phase II. These efforts focused on specific issues that the team was addressing 
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in phase II. There was still a lack of focus, however, on strategy and vision and 
more attention on the mechanics of governance. The third parties were helpful, 
but focus was not on the overarching issues causing the divisiveness, which led 
to the failure of the process.  
In phase III, individuals who were leaders within their respective 
organizations and more experienced were brought onto the team. These 
individuals drew on lessons from the past to capture both successes and failures 
of the prior phases to close the knowledge gap and progress forward. They were 
able to detect and correct some of the errors of the past, which led to 
organizational and instrumental learning. They did not dwell, however, on past 
failures but took advantage of them to learn and provide inquiry into the 
dynamics of the process. Chris Argyris posited that with “instrumental learning, 
organizational inquiry yields new ways of thinking and acting that enable the 
improved performance of an organizational task.”198 Participants claimed that the 
prior phases and organizational learning that occurred have contributed to the 
success in phase III and new organizational perspectives being established.   
This level of prior engagement has led the individuals participating in the 
process, as well as the organizations, to gain valuable insight from prior phases. 
Small and incremental changes in chaotic systems can also lead to unexpectedly 
large fluctuations in results.199 A change in the leadership team with the right 
knowledge, experience, and appropriate historical context had a major impact on 
the outcome of the process, as was experienced in the results from phase II to 
phase III. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
Organizations increasingly operate in complex environments that involve 
multiple participants from diverse backgrounds and disciplines. The ability to 
foster and sustain collaborative efforts is essential to long-term success. 
Throughout the three phases of this study, a series of driving forces that created 
a condition for collaboration were present during successful efforts, while a series 
of restraining forces were present during unsuccessful efforts. Organizational 
collaborative capacity is important as decision making and task interdependence 
increase, as occurred in this study.  
1. Results 
In phase I, the participants shared a felt need to collaborate and 
understood the value of doing things together. The parties were able to 
accomplish more by sharing a common goal of improving public safety 
communications in the region. Participant F stated that the goal of improving 
public safety operations “was the main vision and I don’t think anybody ever lost 
sight of that.”200  
While there was no formalized structure in place, collaboration among the 
parties was high. There was a willingness to compromise and collaborate to 
achieve their objectives in phase I. The parties also shared a common incentive 
to collaborate for future HSGP funding opportunities. As the City of Tempe was 
the recipient of a grant, that became an incentive to enhance the collaborative 
efforts and to formalize the governance development process.  
Phase II was staffed heavily with operational personnel involved in the 
discussions. The level of authority of the participants also led to an issue of 
territoriality where many of the participants engaged in the process focused on 
protecting their own interests, rather than moving the process forward. 
Participant E stated that phase II was clearly operating in a competitive mode; he 
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noted about the entire process, “I think they were competing. I absolutely think 
they were competing.”201  He also commented on the issue of territoriality saying, 
“I think there was a lot at stake and people were feeling as though their ground 
was being, you know, trampled on and what some sort of merging could do to 
their jobs, their livelihood, to everything.”202 
While there was more structure in place for phase II than was present in 
phase I, the final decision makers were not immediately engaged in the process, 
which was a failure of the structure. There was a lack of formal roles or 
procedures for maintaining collaboration, the group size was too large to be 
effective, and there was a competition for resources and territory. Participant E 
also stated that the process in phase II could have been more successful with the 
right individuals present. He stated, “I think with the right people it [successful 
governance] could have been achieved previously.”203 
Phase III began with a commitment by the organizations participating to 
provide the appropriate level of leadership to achieve a successful outcome. 
There was a vision and common goal established to achieve a successful 
governance process from top leadership. Participant D stressed the importance 
of outreach and communication with top administrators. During an information 
sharing session in phase III he noted they had “17 police chiefs and their 
command level people there.”204 This level of engagement was important to 
foster support and commitment from the top of the respective stakeholder 
organizations. As the agencies invested in this process, they committed to an 
effective exchange of ideas and information to improve the process.  
As phase III continued, the participants gained an appreciation for each 
other’s views and perspectives, which led to trust being established. Participant 
C discussed trust during this process stating, “I respect you as an individual, I 
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respect your leadership ability, and I trust you to always act, you know, in 
accordance. And so building the trust with the parties that are open to building a 
relationship properly.”205 This trust further fostered collaborative efforts among 
the participating individuals and built stronger relationships. These same 
individuals shared a common commitment to seeing the process through to 
completion, regardless of the disputes or issues that arose during the process.  
This commitment to participation and completion of the governance 
process was critical in building relationships among the participants. Participant B 
stated, “there has just got to be a commitment by both parties to continue to keep 
that relationship moving forward to make it strong.”206 Additionally, this 
commitment “keeps the conversation moving forward.”207 In earlier discussions, 
technology was a driving factor with effective interoperable communications. 
Participant A stated that as systems have evolved and technology improved, 
there is a need to focus more on the aspects of relationships rather than 
technology. He noted, “We focus on technology, but technology is only a small 
piece of relationships.”208 As he spoke of relationships, Participant A also said, 
“let’s see what we can agree on and then we’ll tackle the stuff we can’t.”209 The 
building and fostering of trust and establishing strong relationships was critical to 
the ability to reach compromises and move processes forward to build 
collaborative capacity.  
2. Discussion 
The benefits of developing collaborative capabilities include cost savings 
through the transfer of smart practices, better decision making because of advice 
and information obtained from colleagues, enhanced capacity for collective 
action by dispersed units, and innovation through the cross-pollination of ideas 
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and recombination of scarce resources.210 Phase I was characterized by a focus 
on a “felt need” to collaborate and the sharing of a common goal of achieving 
interoperable communications. This is defined as a “success factor” in Hocevar, 
Jansen, and Thomas’ ICC Model in the purpose and strategy organization design 
component.211 While there was no formalized coordination or structure in place 
for phase I, the groups managed to operate successfully despite this being a 
“barrier factor” in the ICC Model.212 The participants were able to overcome this 
barrier by focusing on the purpose and strategy they set forth early in the 
process.  
Phase II exhibited many of the “barrier factors” detailed in the ICC Model. 
Under purpose and strategy, the parties focused on their own local agency over 
cross-agency concerns. The debate over authority and control focused on 
singular agency needs, rather than cross-agency requirements. This led to a lack 
of goal clarity that eventually resulted in a failure of the process. The structure of 
phase II also demonstrated a failure to include participants of an adequate level 
of authority to achieve collaboration. With the lower-level participants in place, 
there was a lack of accountability and no formal roles or procedures established 
for managing collaboration. As the parties took positions and moved from 
interest-based discussions to focus on positions, there was inadequate 
communication and information sharing, which created distrust among the 
participants. In the ICC Model, these are “barrier factors” in lateral mechanisms 
of the organization design component.213 
As the participants focused on their own territorial issues, this led to a 
competition for resources. Specifically, competition for control, authority, and 
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power, which was another barrier to successful collaboration during the phase II 
discussions. Finally, in phase II there was a lack of appreciation for the 
perspectives of others, which eroded the trust and led to a lack of commitment 
and motivation to endure the challenges that arose and eventually led to a 
complete impasse in the governance development process. Phase II exhibited a 
number of “barrier factors” in the ICC Model that describe the lack of success 
and relatively low level of collaboration occurring during this phase.214  
Phase III demonstrated a shift from “barrier” to “success” factors listed in 
the ICC Model. The participants in phase III continued to share the “felt need” to 
collaborate, shared common goals, recognized the interdependence among the 
interested parties, and were adaptable to interests of other organizations.215 The 
purpose and strategy of the participants in phase III were aligned with achieving 
a high level of collaborative capacity.  
The structure of phase III favored a model of formalized coordination with 
established roles and procedures for managing collaboration. Additionally, the 
level of participant engaged in phase III was of sufficient authority to make 
requisite decisions. Not only did this increase accountability of those 
participating, their involvement also provided for the appropriate resources for 
effective collaboration to occur. Once again, the shift from phase II to phase III 
included the appropriate movement from “barrier” to “success” factors identified 
in the structure component of the ICC Model.216  
In phase III, there was significant leadership support and commitment. 
Organizations committed to the success of the process by providing appropriate 
policy-level participants and engaging in the process. This shared collaboration 
reduced the competitive rivalries that were present in phase II. Each organization 
acknowledged the benefits of the collaborative efforts, realized that sharing of 
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resources was not only fiscally responsible but also improved public safety 
operations leading back to the common goal, and recognized interdependence. 
The issues surrounding territoriality were reduced and the spirit of mutual respect 
and trust were established. In phase III, there was a movement from apathy of 
not being concerned with outcome to an attitude of success as being the only 
acceptable outcome of the process. These incentives were “success” factors in 
the process that were not present in phase II.  
Finally, the people aspect of the ICC Model was a critical component for 
the success experienced in phase III. The team assigned in phase III worked 
diligently to understand and appreciate each other’s perspectives. This formed a 
culture of trust among the participants and in turn, the organizations they 
represented. These individuals also shared a common commitment and 
motivation to develop a successful collaborative governance development 
process that avoided the prior efforts.217  
When the governance process began in phase I, collaboration was 
occurring but the level of collaborative capacity was not high. There is consensus 
among the participants that the process worked in phase I, but as witnessed by 
the transition to phase II, was not sufficient to sustain itself as more institutional 
(versus operational) issues needed to be addressed. Phase II was characterized 
by several “barrier” factors identified in the ICC Model under purpose and 
strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives, and people.218  
Phase III efforts demonstrated many of the “success” factors identified in 
the ICC Model. The participants and organizations in phase III enhanced their 
collaborative capacity by employing factors that allowed for greater success. 
Participants acknowledged their efforts in phase III were successful, but noted 
there was no specific model or particular guidance they were emulating. Once 
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the participants shifted from those “barrier” to “success” factors (even though not 
intentionally) they began to experience greater success, increased trust, and 
enhanced collaborative capacity. The ability to focus early in the process on 
those factors affecting interorganizational collaboration appears to be critical to 
success in the governance development process.  
E. PROCESSES 
During the interviews with participants and throughout the course of the 
study, several processes to governance development emerged as important 
factors for success. Two factors were particularly significant in the findings: 
negotiation and conflict management. While organizations and participants 
engaged with the establishment of governance, they sought agreement on 
several areas of opposing interest. This presented opportunities for negotiation 
techniques to become factors in the process. Additionally, negotiation efforts 
provoked conflict among the organizations that needed to be managed. Conflict 
managed improperly led to a breakdown of the process and damaged 
relationships in the governance development process. Conflict managed 
effectively produced successful outcomes.  
1. Negotiation 
Negotiation occurs when two or more parties seek to reach agreement 
and resolve opposing interests. When parties focus on positions and not 
interests, their negotiation strategies revolve around distributive processes where 
the belief is there can only be a single winner in the discussion. This leads to 
ineffective solution development and often a breakdown in the process. As the 
parties shift focus to interests, and not positions, the movement towards 
integrative negotiations occurs where win/win outcomes are sought to reduce 
competition and allow for collaboration to occur. 
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a. Results 
Phase I represented a bilateral relationship between the City of Phoenix 
and the City of Mesa. This bilateral relationship was important since only two 
parties were involved in the discussion. As the process evolved, more parties 
became engaged with attempting to formalize the process, making negotiations 
much more difficult. These two entities had a positive working relationship with 
each other due to this one-on-one interaction. There was still a lack of trust 
between the entities, however. Participant E stated that while the parties were 
working well, “I think there was some lack of trust possibly between the two 
entities, both thinking—you know, 800 pound gorillas.”219  
The process in phase II was initially built on trust and cooperation. 
Participant A stated, “The communication directors and the engineers from Mesa 
and Phoenix were able to build this whole thing out of a whole platform of trust 
and cooperation. When we came down to governance, we lost it.”220 The 
participants had a positive relationship to the point when phase II began and 
even through the early stages of the phase. As the process reached the point in 
the negotiations where issues surrounding trust, control, and legal concerns 
became the focus of the discussions, however, the process began to falter.  
As the negotiations between the parties continued to revolve around 
several critical issues, the process became a power struggle between the entities 
over these perceived finite resources. Participant D noted, “When they started to 
do the negotiation, it started moving towards assertiveness and competing and a 
power struggle…a bit to the breaking point.”221 In phase II, the parties viewed 
compromise as a win/lose proposition. Participant F stated, “It was truly zero 
sum, win/lose. I’m going to get it and you’re not, or I get the control and you don’t 
get the control.”222 The parties reached high levels of conflict over these issues 
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during the negotiation process in phase II. There eventually was impasse where 
no further progress was being achieved. As discussed in earlier results, an 
eventual ultimatum was issued that ended the process. Participant F talked about 
the letter saying, “I think it came across, unfortunately, too negatively. It was very 
negative. That ultimatum was very negative.”223 Phoenix intended this letter as a 
notice to Mesa that the current discussions were not achieving the desired 
outcome of establishing a successful governance process. It was not intended as 
an ultimatum, but a suggestion that a new course of action should be pursued.  
Mesa, however, took this as a negative statement in the form of an 
ultimatum of there being no further room to negotiate or that it was suggested the 
system proceed with two independent structures. Participant A said, “You know, 
when the ultimatum came down, rather than maybe a suggestion for a different 
direction, when it came down as an ultimatum it stopped the process.”224 While 
there was debate between Phoenix and Mesa over the actual intent, the result 
was a complete breakdown of the negotiation process.  
Phase III was characterized by the need to reestablish relationships and 
build the trust that was eroded as a result of how phase II ended many years 
prior. Early in the process, there was an effort to define the procedures of the 
negotiation process to establish the rules of conduct and seek to reestablish 
trust. Rather than a focus on what was or was not possible, the team committed 
to open and honest communications and during the negotiation process, as 
Participant E stated, “Everything was an option.”225 In addition, he also 
discussed the role of trust in negotiations, stating “…but I’m talking about trust 
just within this group. I know that early on in the process, and this was one of our, 
you know, rules of engagement, and that was the elephant in the corner. There 
will be no elephants. If you are thinking it, say it.”226 The commitment to 
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possibilities and open and honest communications facilitated the repair of the 
previously damaged relationships.  
With more options, the focus of phase III shifted to win/win opportunities. 
Participant A was involved in the prior phases, and he noted that if compromise 
or win/win focus does not occur, “We’ll fail again—if it doesn’t occur, we will fail 
again.”227 Participant E is the chair of the governance working group in phase III. 
He discussed the win/win option as, “instead of A or B, maybe there’s another 
option that we both get something out of it versus you have to walk away a loser 
and I have to walk away the winner.”228 
In addition to achieving win/win negotiated outcomes, the team in phase III 
also ensured the focus was on interests and not positions. In phase II, the 
process broke down when each party held to their position regarding authority 
and control. There was no discussion of understanding the underlying interest, 
which led to impasse. In phase III, there was a movement from win/lose to 
win/win. As the parties moved to interest-based negotiations, Participant G said, 
“I’d rather call it solution development versus problem solving.”229 The failed 
negotiations of the past were not dwelled upon. The team used the historical 
context of the prior negotiations to learn about those issues that caused the 
process to fail, but focused their efforts on future success rather than past failure. 
Participant G stated, “We use reference points of what broke down in the past, 
but not use that as a mechanism to try and come up with future solutions.”230 
b. Discussion 
Phase I was not characteristic of a negotiation situation in that there was 
no conflict of needs between two or more parties. Phase I was described as 
working well with relatively little need for negotiation processes to occur given the 
                                            
227 Interview with Participant A, November 17, 2014. 
228 Interview with Participant E, November 25, 2014. 
229 Interview with Participant G, December 11, 2014. 
230 Ibid. 
 80 
bilateral relationship and operational focus, which made agreement easier to 
achieve with the relatively uncontentious issues at the time. Once efforts to 
formalize the governance development process began to occur and critical 
issues and topics arose, however, the need for negotiations became necessary.  
In phase I, the parties sensed a need to work together and they felt that 
the possible outcome is better than they could achieve alone. During the 
progression of phase II, it became apparent that the parties lost the perception 
they needed each other, which compromised the negotiations. The discussion in 
phase II focused on win/lose propositions and the parties engaged in distributive 
bargaining. These zero-sum situations (or distributive situations) are ones in 
which there can be only one winner or where the parties are attempting to get a 
larger share or piece of a fixed resource.231 Intergroup disputes became intense 
as each organization attempted to negotiate for control and authority. Intergroup 
conflict occurs between organizations as well. Conflict at this level of a 
negotiation process is very complex and quite intricate because of the large 
number of people involved and the many ways they can interact with each 
other.232 In phase II, the parties focused on their positions in an attempt to garner 
a larger piece of the fixed resource. This led to a focus on positions rather than 
interests. The issue in phase II over control and emphasis on distributive 
bargaining is a classic example of negotiating over positions and failing to 
understand underlying interests.233  
As the focus was only on win/lose scenarios, the process eventually 
reached impasse. This may be defined as difficult-to-resolve negotiations and as 
a condition or state of conflict in which there is no apparent quick or easy 
resolution.234 The parties in phase II both reached a point where there would be 
no perceived winner and each chose to cease negotiations. The chances of 
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impasse increase when parties are unorganized, the social system from which 
the parties evolve is ill defined, there are fundamental value differences on key 
issues, and the conflict repeatedly escalates.235 
In phase II, all of these variables appeared to be occurring, which 
eventually resulted in impasse. Mesa felt that the response to the negotiations by 
Phoenix was not an appropriate response to this situation. Barbara Gray 
suggested that another reason negotiations reach impasse is that the parties 
negotiating allow their emotions to determine their reaction to the other party 
rather than responding in a measured way to the situation.236 Based on the 
letters and resulting damaged relationships, this was the case in phase II. It was 
also viewed that Mesa responded to Phoenix’s tactics in kind, which escalated 
the conflict to the point of complete process failure.   
Phase III participants began by seeking to establish mutual trust and 
respect. Clear rules of engagement were defined before any negotiations were to 
occur, which set the stage for reaching consensus or engagement with healthy 
dialogue over issues requiring negotiation. The team involved in phase III moved 
from distributive bargaining tactics to integrative negotiation methods. When 
discussing the fact that everything was now an option, the parties were 
attempting to find solutions so both parties could do well and achieve their 
respective goals.237 The efforts of phase III moved away from win/lose to win/win 
outcomes so both parties could achieve mutual gain and move the process 
forward.  
The team in phase III also sought to understand problems fully. Instead of 
a focus on a particular position, which was the failure of phase II, the team 
sought to identify and understand each other’s interests. Understanding interests 
permitted them to invent solutions that would meet each other’s needs and 
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achieve successful outcomes.238 Phase III also shifted the focus from 
substantive interests to relationship interests. In phase II, the discussion was on 
substantive interests, which led to anger over the situation and disagreement 
over the solution to the problem. Phase III, however, moved this process to 
relationship interests. The team negotiating focused on maintaining positive 
relationships between the parties, which allowed them to deal directly with the 
concerns in a measured and harmonious manner.239 
Phase III also followed a more strategic method of negotiating. As Watkins 
discussed in his model, structure and strategy are directly related to processes 
and eventually outcomes.240 The team in phase III established a structure and 
strategy to follow during their negotiations that emphasized the need to define 
those aspects of the issue before moving to the process or outcome. This was in 
direct conflict with the focus on phase II, where the team attempted to seek 
outcomes before developing any form of structure or strategy. As Watkins’ model 
describes, the dimensions of the negotiation process are linked together and 
understanding the elements of a successful negotiation process can assist with 
enhancing structure and shaping strategy.  
Phase III was characterized by more structure and strategy being defined 
early in the process before issues being negotiated reached a critical level. This 
structure and strategy allowed successful negotiation to occur to seek integrative 
solutions that ultimately resulted in both parties walking away winners, avoiding 
impasse and the damaged relationships that occurred in phase II. The strategies 
in phase III followed many established successful negotiation processes that 
were absent in earlier phases. This attention to these successful negotiation 
strategies has resulted in successful discussions and mutual agreement while 
maintaining positive relationships built on mutual respect and trust.  
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2. Conflict Management 
When conflict is productively managed, cooperation and collaboration are 
high. When conflict is not productively managed, this often leads to a 
deterioration of trust or a breakdown in the collaborative process. When parties 
focus only on their own needs, their level of assertiveness becomes high and 
cooperation low. This often leads to competition and avoidance, which is 
detrimental to the governance development process. Agencies that seek to focus 
on the interests of others and establishment of relationships often move towards 
compromise and collaboration. Throughout the course of the three phases, as 
efforts shifted from distributive to integrative processes, conflict was effectively 
managed to produce collaborative processes and successful outcomes. 
a. Results 
Phase I of the process operated in a manner where the parties 
experienced relatively low levels of conflict. It was often described as operating 
successfully with no conflict between the parties. Communication between the 
groups was well established, there was a free flow of information, and concerns 
were quickly expressed and addressed effectively. When participants were asked 
about this process using the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument (TKI) 
chart, many of the respondents indicated on the chart that phase I was operating 
with medium to high levels of cooperativeness between the parties.241  
Additionally, even though there were indications of low, middle, and high 
levels of assertiveness, the respondents overwhelmingly stated that phase I 
discussions were operating by compromising, accommodating, and collaborating. 
No participants noted any form of competition occurring during phase I. One 
participant stated there did appear to be some avoidance occurring. More than 
withdrawing from the situation, however, it was just avoidance of formalizing the 
governance development process. Figure 7 represents a TKI chart showing 
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where the participants indicated that phase I would be placed on this chart at the 
organizational level. Some participant codes appear more than once since 
multiple modes were in use during the phase.  
 
Figure 7.  TKI Chart Indicating Participant Placement in Phase I242 
Initially, phase II began with low levels of conflict as the parties engaged in 
meaningful discussions and made significant efforts to develop a successful 
governance development process. Once issues related to trust, control, authority, 
voting rights, and other legal issues arose, however, the process fell apart. The 
ultimatum discussed earlier in this chapter also resulted in the increasing conflict 
between the parties in phase II that stopped the process. When discussing the 
destructive conflict that occurred in phase II, Participant E responded by saying, 
“It was spike sticks! There were no sacred cows!”243 This level of destructive 
conflict in phase II also resulted in competition between the parties. The conflict 
resulted from the competitive nature of the discussions centered around win/lose 
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propositions and perceptions of zero sum outcomes. Participant F stated, “It was 
truly zero sum, win/lose. I’m going to get it and you’re not, or I get control and 
you don’t get control.”244 
There was also unwillingness to compromise, which further increased the 
competitive nature of phase II. This again was due to the level of participants 
engaged in the process having a direct stake in the outcome of the process, 
which made compromise difficult to achieve. Participant F was one of these 
individuals, and he noted, “You’ve got a real deep stake in it and so when you’re 
compromising or changing, you feel it more closely. You know, I know I did.”245 
The need for control of the situation also contributed to the conflict. As the 
parties attempted to negotiate perceived finite resources, the competition was 
high for control, which contributed to the high levels of conflict experienced in 
phase II. This conflict eventually resulted in a complete breakdown among the 
participants and ultimately, between the organizations. The ultimatum stopped 
the dialogue completely. When the participants committed to their positions and 
the conflict increased, the parties began to “dig into their positions,” as 
Participant C described.246  
Participants were again asked to indicate on a TKI chart where the 
organizations were operating during phase II. The respondents indicated that 
cooperativeness was operating at the lower end of the scale and assertiveness 
was high. This placed the conflict modes in phase II predominantly in the 
competing mode. Figure 8 represents a TKI chart showing where the participants 
indicated that phase II would be placed on this chart at the organizational level. 
Some participant codes appear more than once since multiple modes were in 
use during the phase. 
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Figure 8.  TKI Chart Indicating Participant Placement in Phase II247 
Phase III was characterized by significantly less conflict among the 
participants. The process was much more cooperative in nature with parties 
working through conflict that would arise rather than employing destructive 
conflict practices. Participant E stated about phase III, “I think we’re highly 
cooperative. I think there are still some accommodating going on to help maintain 
some harmony, but think that is a natural evolution.”248 
In phase III, the parties also relinquished control, which allowed for 
competition to decrease and more compromise and collaboration to occur. The 
participants recognized that without compromise, there would be another 
potential losing situation or worse, another impasse to discussions. Participant A 
described the shift from phase I to phase III as, “...to accomplish those goals, 
you’ve got to walk into it with an open mind and the ability to compromise and the 
understanding on both sides that nobody has to give anything up.”249 This moved 
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the conflict from competitive win/lose zero-sum processes to more win/win 
situations.  
Participants also all discussed the ability in phase III for the parties to 
collaborate with higher-level involvement. This allowed conflict to be handled at 
the highest levels with decision and policy makers who were able to expand the 
range of possibilities in the process when conflict would arise. This higher-level 
focus was described by Participant A saying, “You’re able to collaborate, 
because you’re not as focused on, you know, the nuts and bolts of it.”250 As 
conflict arose in phase III, the parties were able to compromise and collaborate to 
address the concern. Participant G stated, “I may have to compromise or do 
something differently to get to where I need to go.”251 
Participants were again asked to indicate on a TKI chart where the 
organizations were operating during phase III. The respondents indicated that 
cooperativeness was operating at the middle to highest end of the scale. 
Assertiveness ranged from low, middle, to high throughout the entire phase III 
process. This placed the conflict modes in phase III in the compromising, 
accommodating, and collaborating modes. No respondents indicated any type of 
competition occurring in phase III. All seven participants indicated that phase III 
was operating in the collaborating mode. Figure 9 represents a TKI chart 
showing where the participants indicated that phase III would be placed on this 
chart at the organizational level. Some participant codes appear more than once 
since multiple modes were in use during the phase.   
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Figure 9.  TKI Chart Indicating Participant Placement in Phase III252 
b. Discussion 
In phase I, the parties involved in the governance development process 
worked in a collaborative manner to address mutual concerns and address any 
issues that would arise. This phase was characterized by relatively low levels of 
conflict. Participants indicated that conflict did not appear to present itself during 
phase I often, if at all. This allowed the participants to focus on cooperation and 
continuing to foster mutual relationships. Even though each of the parties 
experienced assertiveness levels ranging from low and medium to high in phase 
I, the parties were able to constructively address any such conflict to effectively 
resolve issues and continue in a collaborative relationship. As the participants 
noted on the TKI chart for phase I, the ability to effectively address conflict 
resulted in no competition and high levels of compromising, accommodating, and 
collaborating.  
As phase II evolved, high levels of conflict occurred over a series of issues 
relating to control and authority. This resulted in conflict among the parties 
involved in phase II. The parties in phase II did not address this conflict in a 
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constructive manner. The parties were challenging each other using distributive 
power tactics to address the conflict. Distributive power occurs when a party 
attempts to get their way by directing enough power at others to force a 
compromise or concession of some kind.253 In addition to the distributive power 
at play, the parties became skeptical of each other and discussions from the 
opposite party were often met with suspicion and unambiguous dismissal.254 
This resulted in a significant competition for resources and power. 
During phase II, the more assertive method of addressing conflict led to 
significant competition between the parties. With assertiveness high and 
cooperativeness low on the TKI chart, the parties engaged in zero-sum 
processes, win/lose propositions, and significant power struggles. If conflict is not 
framed constructively, impasse is likely to result, as occurred in phase II.  
Phase III was structured to allow conflict to occur, but the governance 
team provided the mechanism for any conflict to be framed constructively. As 
conflict arose, the parties involved would address the concern in an honest and 
forthcoming manner. Difficult issues resulting in conflict were not ignored. This 
reframing effort also focused on interests and not positions, allowing the team to 
understand the underlying nature of the conflict to address the concern with 
options, rather than an immediate escalation of the situation.255 Participants 
indicated they were aware that the conflict that occurred in phase II required a 
different approach to reach consensus and address conflict in a constructive 
manner for phase III.  
Abraham Maslow stated, “I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have 
is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.”256 This statement shows that 
the movement from distributive power (assertiveness) to integrative power 
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(cooperativeness and assertiveness) allowed for a greater range of options and 
tools to use to address a concern rather than a single solution to complex issues. 
In phase III, parties used their power to increase the overall influence of all the 
parties involved in a dispute or negotiation; they were applying power in an 
integrative way.257 This method achieves greater levels of collaboration and 
expands the possible range of options to address conflict with more tools.  
Often, conflict may be handled differently when the environment or 
structure within which it exists changes, or the individuals involved significantly 
mature or evolve.258 The movement from phase II to phase III was an example of 
changing the structure and the environment with a focus on using integrative 
power versus distributive power to address conflict. Rather than immediately 
responding with hard power, the participants in phase III sought to understand 
the level in which disputes were occurring to address the issues constructively.  
All of the participants in phase III unanimously agreed that the parties 
were operating at the collaborating mode of the TKI. This finding is significant in 
that this is the only result that was unanimous among the seven interview 
participants. The conflict management process established in phase III allowed 
conflict to occur, but rather than focusing on win/lose or zero-sum orientations, all 
possible options were considered to achieve win/win outcomes and mitigate 
conflict to allow collaboration to occur. Phase III exhibited a shift from phase II by 
progressing along the TKI from narrow interests to more inclusive interests.259 
This migration along the TKI occurred among the participants as part of their 
effort to structure their conflict management processes to be more constructive, 
which has ultimately led to successful collaboration that was not present in phase 
II.  
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While phase I exhibited some collaboration, with the absence of conflict it 
is difficult to determine how effective that informal process may have been with 
conflict management should a significant disagreement have occurred. Phase III 
demonstrates, however, the value of focusing on the needs of others, 
maintaining mutual relationships, and focusing on the needs of both parties to 
achieve high levels of collaboration as identified in the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict 
Mode Instrument.260 
F. MISCELLANEOUS 
Other various topics emerged from the case analysis. The factors 
described below were not of a significant enough nature to warrant separate 
analysis. They are presented in this section, however, due to the value they may 
provide in the overall comparative case analysis. They include: timing of the 
governance process, employee organization engagement, importance of a 
“champion” for the cause, changing operational conditions, and legal factors.  
1. Results 
Phase I experienced a number of triggering events that began the 
movement from phase I to phase II. While there was a vision of adding more 
partners, the funding that allowed an additional member to consider joining the 
network proved to be a motivating factor for this governance development 
process to begin its evolution. As the system was also seeking to expand its 
operations, the two parties sought to share infrastructure and make better use of 
the resources available within the region. It was thought that the success 
experienced in phase I was due to the bilateral relationship that existed. When 
adding additional partners, the process became increasingly complex and levels 
of conflict increased.  
Phase II continued with the recognition that a formalized governance 
development process was needed before the network became too large to 
                                            
260 Thomas, The Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology.  
 92 
manage using informal efforts. Participant A stated that the parties had “to 
address governance before this goes too far,”261 meaning the addition of more 
partner agencies. In addition to better use of resources, an emphasis was put on 
reducing duplication of effort. Phase II also witnessed the operational 
environment changing. As major national events began to receive domestic 
attention and highlight the need for interoperable public safety communications, 
the parties engaged in phase II sensed pressure to formalize the process and 
expand their operations.  
Despite eventually reaching impasse in phase II, Participant D noted that 
a solid governance document was produced from this process. He stated, “I think 
the success was there was a base document that was built, the governance 
document was built that had all the right elements in there of the major themes 
and categories.”262 The joint governance document produced in phase II later 
became the basis for both the RWC and TRWC to use as their foundational 
governance agreement document. This same document became the starting 
point for phase III to begin the discussion process.  
Phase III continued to be influenced by operational necessity and 
changing national events. There was also a city manager who became a 
champion to recognize that the ending to phase II was unacceptable and there 
should be efforts to reconcile and address comprehensive governance for the 
region. As Participant D described this individual, “He had the flag that he was 
carrying that talked about merging the two systems and he was charging up this 
hill!”263 The role of a consortium of all Metropolitan Phoenix/Mesa fire 
departments also became a catalyst to move this process forward in phase III. 
The fire employee organizations began to ask, “How could you let this 
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happen?”264 That put political pressure to also reengage in this process and 
complete a successful governance development process. 
While legal concerns also arose in all phases of this process, phase III 
was marked by a collaborative process between legal counsels of the parties, 
who also modified their approach to governance development processes to 
achieve higher levels of success by using many of the successful strategies the 
governance working group employed.  
2. Discussion 
The vision of adding more partners and the incentive to receive funding to 
include additional agencies in the process proved to be a powerful catalyst to 
move the process from phase I to phase II. Fiscal responsibility and resource 
utilization also became influential motivators to trigger change. Throughout the 
analysis, a common theme emerged that two parties were more easily managed 
than multiple partners. This highlights the complexity that moving from a bilateral 
relationship poses for the governance development process. The participants 
agreed that governance was necessary as the system became larger with more 
partners.  
Another pressure point that triggered movement was national and local 
pressure to establish more effective interoperable communications for public 
safety personnel. As the public and fire employee organizations put this at the 
forefront, the pressure also resulted in a need to move the processes forward. A 
success that emerged from phase I and phase II was the document that was 
produced. This document became the baseline for the separate cooperatives and 
even in phase III became the base manuscript that was used to begin 
discussions. This document proved to be valuable and necessary to get from 
phase I to phase III. What is unknown is if the process in phase III would have 
been as successful without the effort of the prior governance development 
phases.  
                                            
264 Interview with Participant D, November 24, 2014. 
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Finally, many of the participants discussed the need to establish a 
governance development process before a system is designed, constructed, and 
put into operation. The establishment of an effective governance process initially 
establishes the legal structure and defines relationships before funding and 
territorial issues present themselves.  
G. SUMMARY 
Phase I was described by participants as operating extremely 
successfully, despite the lack of a formalized governance development process. 
Low conflict and relatively high levels of collaboration marked this phase. During 
phase I, participants had appropriate operational authority, shared a common 
mission, and effectively managed conflict with appropriate resolution 
mechanisms. Phase II experienced a significant amount of competition, 
territoriality, destructive conflict management processes, and few collaborative 
efforts. The participants in phase II also lacked strategic vision, focused on 
differences instead of commonalities, managed negotiation processes with 
distributive power tactics, were deficient in executive management engagement 
early in the process, and lacked appropriate experience or knowledge to 
accomplish the task they were given. This phase ended in a complete breakdown 
of the process and the establishment of two competitive wireless cooperatives. 
Phase III was characterized by high levels of cooperation, constructive conflict 
management processes, and extremely high levels of collaboration. This resulted 
in a successful governance development process. This phase is culminating in 
the planned merger of the two separate cooperatives over time.  
In phase I, the participants operated successfully in a bilateral relationship 
with high levels of collaboration. As the process evolved to phase II, when proper 
techniques were not employed, the process failed. In phase III when participants 
used established concepts of governance establishment, negotiation, conflict 
management, and “success” factors for collaboration, successful governance 
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development processes prevailed. Chapter V will present the conclusions and 
recommendations derived from these results.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The findings of this comparative case analysis demonstrate the dynamics 
that may occur in establishing an effective governance development process. As 
domestic homeland security efforts continue to require multi-jurisdictional and 
multi-disciplinary approaches to prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and 
recovery from human-caused and natural disasters, the ability to learn from the 
experiences of others is critical to future success.  
This thesis sought to examine the evolution of the governance 
development process that spanned three distinct phases and 16 years. The three 
phases are: 
• 1999–2004: Informal Governance Operations (Successful) 
• 2004–2008: Formalized Governance Development (Unsuccessful) 
• 2008–Current: Formalized Governance Development (Successful) 
The comparative case analysis illustrates aspects of both success and 
failure through the process and generates recommendations that other agencies 
may employ in their own governance development to accelerate the process or 
achieve successful outcomes more quickly. Answers to the four research 
questions are presented, along with recommendations for future endeavors.  
B. WHAT MOTIVATED THE SHIFT FROM AN INFORMAL GOVERNANCE 
SYSTEM TO A BUREAUCRATIC/INSTITUTIONALIZED GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURE? 
In the early stages of the partnership between the City of Phoenix and the 
City of Mesa, the parties operated successfully by establishing a bilateral 
relationship using informal governance processes. Participants in the early phase 
of this process were primarily from technical and operational backgrounds with 
limited policy-making authority. Despite the absence of a formalized governance 
structure, the two parties provided an exceptional public safety radio network. As 
issues arose, the two parties were able to successfully address concerns 
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mutually and reach consensus. As they began to add partners, however, they 
recognized the need to expand the governance development process to more 
institutional-level issues and to formalize their relationship.  
Even though the partnership was largely informal in phase I, the two 
parties had a clear delineation of boundaries to include defined operational roles 
and responsibilities, jurisdictional boundaries, property ownership, frequency 
ownership, and established reporting structures (authority and control). These 
two parties also exercised significant control over their individual financial 
engagement.  
In 2005, the City of Tempe received a 2005 COPS Interoperable 
Communications Technology Grant to join the existing network. The addition of 
another partner signaled a need to shift from the informal structure to a 
formalized governance development process. The original two parties 
understood that once additional jurisdictions were included in the system, critical 
governance roles, responsibilities, authorities, and procedures would need to be 
documented and codified. No longer would a simple informal agreement to 
cooperate adequately address the governance issues required for three or more 
municipalities to engage in the management of such a complex and costly 
communications system.  
External conditions also motivated a shift to a formalized governance 
structure. National homeland security efforts continued to focus on multi-
jurisdictional and multi-discipline approaches to prevention, protection, mitigation, 
response, and recovery efforts outlined in the DHS National Preparedness 
Goal.265 Additionally, pressure was placed upon entities to resolve differences 
and collaborate on regional projects across all levels of government relating to 
homeland security initiatives, such as interoperable communications systems. A 
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shift in financial conditions due to a recession that began in 2008266 also 
necessitated that governmental agencies more effectively collaborate to share 
resources, eliminate unnecessary redundancy, and reduce operating costs.  
The time between phase II and phase III also saw a change in leadership, 
which motivated a shift in the process. A board of directors for both the RWC and 
TRWC was established, with city management personnel comprising the 
membership. These executive-level managers shared a different vision from the 
earlier phases and triggered movement. The addition of partners to the 
separated systems also continued to motivate the need for a single and unified 
governance development process in the region. The persistent external factors 
applied pressure to institutionalize the governance structure while remaining 
competitive for additional homeland security funding opportunities and providing 
better service to the public through enhanced regional homeland security 
capabilities.  
Had the two initial parties remained in a bilateral relationship without the 
inclusion of additional partners, it is likely that the motivation to shift from an 
informal governance system to bureaucratic/institutionalized governance may not 
have occurred, or would not have been necessary until a later time. In addition, if 
external conditions remained constant, the impetus to engage in the 
development of a formalized process may have been delayed or not occurred 
entirely.  
C. WHAT ARE THE ENABLERS AND BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE 
COLLABORATION IN THIS CASE? 
Phase I was characterized by the two parties having a “felt need” to 
collaborate and develop a shared communication system. Although the parties 
did not initially establish a formal governance development process, they had a 
common goal and recognized a shared interdependence. The two parties also 
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established mechanisms to effectively communicate and share information. 
Without any competitive rivalries, the cooperative nature of the two parties 
allowed a strong trusting relationship to develop during this phase. Phase I 
exhibited many of the enabling or “success” factors in Hocevar, Jansen, and 
Thomas’ ICC Model. These included a “felt need” to collaborate, a common goal, 
effective communication and information exchange, absence of competitive 
rivalries, acknowledged benefits of collaboration, trust, commitment and 
motivation, and technical interoperability. With the exception of a lack of formal 
roles for managing collaboration, no other “barrier” factors were evident.267 This 
phase was successful by all accounts of the participants interviewed.  
During phase II, the participants lacked goal clarity and focused on 
divergent goals. Phase I emphasized operational and technical issues, which 
were common goals for the parties. As phase II began, the same participants 
from phase I engaged in the governance development process. Due to the 
issues shifting from operational and technical to policy making, the participants in 
phase II had inadequate authority to make binding or authoritative decisions 
needed to establish an effective governance development process. A lack of 
formal roles and established procedures for managing the collaborative process 
created conflict among the participants.  
A sense of distrust also emerged as the parties treated each other with 
suspicion and doubt. Ultimately, participants described this as a competition for 
resources and an increased sense of territoriality that was detrimental to the 
governance development process and led to hostility and eventually complete 
impasse. Phase II was characterized as experiencing little to no collaboration, 
resulting in a complete failure of the governance development process.  
Interview participants stated phase III was successful due to the focus on 
a common goal and recognized interdependence among the parties engaged in 
the process. A formalized coordination group was established with sufficient 
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authority to make binding and authoritative decisions on behalf of their respective 
organizations. The parties involved in phase III also invested heavily in 
developing social capital and establishing interpersonal networks to effectively 
communicate and share information. Executive-level leadership supported the 
governance development process and was committed to achieving success. 
Absent were the competitive rivalries that existed in phase II. Phase III focused 
on shared benefits, shared resources, an appreciation of others’ perspectives, 
and a commitment to collaboration. Trust among participants was a factor to 
achieve commitment and motivation. The trust to share open and honest 
communications in the negotiation process of governance development led to a 
greater commitment and motivation to complete the process from the 
participants. This was not present in phase II.    
Each phase of the governance development process in this case exhibits 
many of the factors affecting interorganizational collaboration detailed in the ICC 
Model. Phase I and III focused on several “success” factors. There was a “felt 
need” to collaborate, a common goal and recognized interdependence, sufficient 
authority of the participants for issues relevant during the phase, effective 
communication and information exchange, leadership support, acknowledged 
benefits of collaboration, and trust and commitment.268 When the parties 
engaged in phases I and III employed “success” factors, they achieved high 
levels of collaboration among the participants. In phase II, absent were many of 
the “success” factors. Instead, the governance development process 
predominantly exhibited “barrier” factors. These included divergent goals, focus 
on local organization instead of cross-agency concerns, inadequate authority of 
participants, lack of formal roles or procedures, inadequate communications, 
competition for resources, territoriality, and lack of mutual respect.269 A focus on 
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these “barrier” factors resulted in a lack of collaboration. Ultimately, not only was 
there a lack of collaboration, but a total collapse of the process. 
The findings of the analysis of the three phases demonstrate that a focus 
on “success” factors leads to enhanced interorganizational collaborative efforts. 
When a significant number of “barrier” factors are present in governance 
development processes, the collaboration is negatively affected to a point where 
continued focus on those factors may ultimately lead to dissolution of any 
continued collaborative efforts and a failure of the process.   
D. HOW DID THE COLLABORATIVE PROCESS EVOLVE OVER TIME 
AND WHAT WAS THE IMPACT? 
In phase I, the governance development process was informal and 
followed no established governance structure. The early phases of this effort 
were characterized by high levels of cooperation and a significant amount of 
collaboration, compromise, and accommodation. Phase I was also characterized 
by an entirely operational focus with little focus on strategic or policy-level issues. 
The parties were satisfied with this bilateral relationship and achieved successful 
outcomes operating in this mode for approximately 5 years. This was successful 
due to the wireless network providing public safety personnel with a reliable, 
interoperable system, which improved operational and response capabilities. 
Additionally, both parties were satisfied with their level of control and financial 
commitment to this unified effort and experienced no conflict. The participants 
made a concerted effort to focus on mutual concerns and maintain positive 
working relationships in phase I. Issues such as ownership of radio frequencies, 
property ownership for communications network infrastructure, and the 
distribution of voting rights (i.e., authority and control) were not concerns for the 
two parties since they did not present themselves in phase I. The parties were 
able to resolve issues that did arise informally and one-on-one due to the nature 
of their relationship at the time.  
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When movement towards the addition of partners began to occur, the 
process evolved to one in which a formal effort was initiated to establish and 
document a governance agreement to accommodate the multitude of partners 
that were expected to eventually join the network. During phase II, when the two 
parties began to discuss the issues surrounding frequencies, property ownership, 
and distribution of voting rights, the effort shifted from collaboration, 
compromising, and accommodating to an entirely competitive mode. As the 
conflict reached significant levels, a complete lack of cooperation occurred as 
both parties withdrew from the situation, leading to impasse in the governance 
development process.  
Despite phase I exhibiting collaborative efforts and phase II exhibiting 
none, phase III evolved from the prior two efforts to produce a successful 
process. The knowledge and experience of the prior phases allowed the group in 
phase III to achieve higher levels of collaboration and success. The process 
evolved from zero-sum orientations that were present in phase II to win/win 
outcomes by expanding the range of possible options in the process in phase III. 
The movement from distributive to integrative bargaining led to extremely high 
levels of collaboration occurring. Cooperation was high as the parties engaged in 
phase III focused on the needs of others more so than on their individual or 
organizational needs to build and maintain mutual relationships. Phase I was 
successful with collaboration while phase II was absent nearly all collaborative 
efforts. As the process evolved in phase III, a renewed effort to focus on 
relationships led to less conflict and greater success at establishing an effective 
collaborative governance development process.  
The evolution of the process had the impact of rebuilding previously 
damaged relationships and ensuring successful outcomes to the discussions that 
occurred between the parties. With a shift from competitive processes to those 
where cooperation was at the forefront, the entire governance process was able 
to succeed where prior efforts had failed. Additionally, a commitment to work 
through conflict rather than respond with negative actions also increased trust 
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and built firm relationships that have been able to withstand conflict and resolve 
issues constructively to achieve successful outcomes.  
E. HOW CAN FUTURE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS USE THE CASE 
FINDINGS TO BUILD GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES 
TO FOSTER SUSTAINMENT AND BUILD FURTHER COLLABORATIVE 
CAPACITY? 
The findings from this comparative case analysis demonstrate the factors 
that emerge during successful governance development processes. These 
factors may be used to build further collaborative capacity for future efforts. 
Efforts to establish effective governance development processes occur in many 
areas of the homeland security enterprise. While this comparative case analysis 
focused on interoperable communications systems, recommendations may be 
applicable across the field and should be considered when establishing 
collaborative processes.  
• Before collaborative efforts begin, ensure that the process is 
established with a formal coordination committee comprised of 
individuals of sufficient authority to commit resources, make binding 
decisions, and develop strategic vision. In addition, ensure 
representation from relevant technical/operational expertise is 
available during the process.  
• Clearly establish a mission, vision, and guiding principles to allow 
for the documentation of goals, objectives, and established benefits 
of collaboration. 
• Make use of frameworks such as Imperial’s LCAF, Watkins’ SSPO, 
Hocevar, Jansen, and Thomas’ ICC Model, the Thomas-Kilmann 
Conflict Mode Instrument, and other models established outside of 
the homeland security community. These models may provide 
insight, knowledge, and experience applicable to homeland security 
efforts to develop collaborative governance development processes 
to produce quicker results.  
• Recognize the governance development process emerges over 
time. The establishment of interpersonal relationships is necessary 
to build trust with counterparts and ensure long-term sustainability 
of the process.  
• Ensure the focus is on organizational interests and not individual 
positions during the negotiation process. This focus on interests will 
allow for a greater range of possibilities and move towards win/win 
scenarios to achieve successful outcomes.  
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• Ensure participants share willingness to compromise and 
participate with integrative bargaining strategies.  
• Develop a mechanism to constructively work through conflict and 
reach consensus rather than become competitive and issue 
ultimatums. 
• Recognize that the addition of parties will create a more complex 
governance development process. The addition of partners, 
however, will allow for more experience, greater insight, and 
establishment of trust among the participants seeking to 
institutionalize governance.   
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Throughout the course of studying the three distinct phases of the 
governance development process, several areas for further research presented 
themselves. The study results begin to answer some of the questions as to how 
collaborative governance development processes evolve and can be successful. 
An important opportunity for additional research continues, however. Further 
study may help supplement the results from this particular comparative analysis 
and provide greater insight into governance development processes.  
(1) Explore the role of triggers and how they impacted each of the 
phases. 
This study briefly captured the motivation that occurred between the 
phases that caused the governance development process to evolve from phase I 
to phase III. The role of these triggers is important to understand, as they were 
the impetus to move from one phase to another. How these triggers affected 
each phase and the role they played may provide greater understanding of the 
efforts between the phases.   
(2) After the process has been institutionalized for a period, conduct 
analysis to determine sustainment of the mechanism in place as a 
result of the governance development process. 
Across phase I, II, and III, the process was in a constant state of evolution 
and change. When the process in phase III is completed and governance 
institutionalized, an analysis could potentially demonstrate the sustainment of the 
efforts established in phase III. Imperial’s model also documents the operational, 
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policy, and institutionalization efforts of governance, but does not study the long-
term sustainment or implications of the institutionalization process. Further 
research upon completion of this process would help determine whether these 
efforts are successful for a short time or if they are able to sustain operations 
long-term.  
(3) If participants in the process change, evaluate how the loss of 
those relationships impacted the collaborative capacity of the 
governance structure.  
Within each separate phase, the participants remained consistent with no 
significant departure of individuals during the process. There were changes 
between the phases, but during each discrete phase the participants remained 
constant. Efforts to institutionalize governance processes are intended to develop 
processes that can withstand changes in leadership and personnel. Once 
governance is completed and a loss of organizational personnel occurs, further 
study as to the continued collaborative capacity of these processes would 
provide a better understanding of the role of the individual in the 
institutionalization process and how the loss may or may not influence the long-
term sustainment of such efforts.  
(4) Rather than interviewing high-level personnel involved in the 
process, consider an alternative case study where operational and 
end users are interviewed for their perspective on the governance 
development process.  
Participants in this study held high-level positions in the governance 
development process. Their understanding of the process may differ 
considerably from those in an operational capacity who must employ the policy 
decisions of these high-level personnel. Consideration should be given to 
conduct a case study where those operational personnel are interviewed for their 
perspective on the governance development process. A study to compare 
perspectives from these individuals may allow further analysis to recognize the 
efforts occurring in the governance development process at both ends of the 
organizational structure.  
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(5) Explore if implementing the recommendations earlier in a similar 
process produces successful results or expedites the timeline.  
If future collaborative governance development processes employ these 
recommendations earlier in their process, a case study to determine if these 
efforts produced successful results earlier in the process should be considered. It 
would appear that employing the recommendations would expedite the success 
achieved in the process. A case study of a future effort that does employ them, 
however, would assist with understanding if that is the case or how that affects 
the timeline, if at all.  
(6) Does the evaluation of the phases as described by Imperial need to 
occur to achieve a fully collaborative state? 
Imperial’s LCAF alludes to a sequential effort to establish operational 
procedures, develop policy, and finally institutionalize governance processes. In 
this case study, that evolution occurred unintentionally but eventually produced 
similar success to that documented in Imperial’s watershed study. An evaluation 
of additional governance development processes would further document if this 
evolution of these phases is necessary to achieve a fully collaborative state or if 
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APPENDIX E. SUMMARY OF THEMES OVER THE THREE PHASES OF GOVERNANCE 
DEVELOPMENT  
THEME PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III 
GOALS FOR GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENT 
Governance 
 
-Operational and technical focus 
 
-Continued operational focus 
-Some strategic and policy processes 
employed in a limited capacity 
-Policy-making focus 
-Institutionalization focus 
Strategic Vision -No vision established  
-Public safety mission established, 
but no guiding principles 
-No concern for strategy or future 
outcomes 
 
-Limited strategic thinking 
-No clear vision of desired long-term 
outcome 
-No clear direction on what was to be 
accomplished 
-Objective based, not vision based 
-Agency interests first, public safety 
needs secondary 
-Operating at strategic level 
-Guiding principles established before 
phase began 
-Champion needed for cause 
-Vision established on long-term desired 
outcomes 
-Vision to put public safety first, agency 
interests second 
Commonalities  -Participants focused on differences 
-Accepted some commonalities in 
operational functions, but continued 
to emphasize differences on structure 
and policy 
-Participants focused on commonalities 
first, differences later in the process 
-Common issues identified to focus 
discussion efforts 
-Time has been helpful with highlighting 





Authority -Informal operational authority 
existed 
-Limited decision-making authority 
 
-Participants not of appropriate 
authority to make binding decisions 
-Policy makers engaged too late in the 
process 
-Once policy makers involved, poor 
decisions made based on limited 
information 
 
-High-level executive participants 
engaged at the beginning of the process 
-Operational personnel engaged as 
needed for specific discussions only 





-Participants from primarily technical 
and operational background with 
limited policy-making experience or 
knowledge 
-Continued involvement by those with 
limited experience and knowledge 
-Learning was occurring during the 
process 
-Historical knowledge of prior phases 
was helpful in developing a plan for 
moving forward and learning from past 
mistakes 
-Having knowledgeable, trained, and 
experienced personnel allowed the 
process to be successful 










ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY 
Collaborative 
Capacity 
-Felt need to collaborate and 
realizing value in doing things 
together and ability to accomplish 
more 
-No formalized structure in place 
 
 
-Lack of formal roles or procedures for 
managing collaboration 
-Group size was too large to be 
effective 
-Competition for resources or territory 
-Individuals had a vested interest in 
process/outcome, which contributed 
to breakdown 
-Commitment of organizations and 
leadership to achieve successful 
outcomes 
-Focus on incremental successes rather 
than a single effort to achieve success 
-Formalized coordination and defined 
roles 
-Agencies invested in the process and 
effective exchange of ideas and 
information 
-Appreciation for others’ views and 
perspectives 
-Commitment to seeing the process 
through to completion regardless of 











Negotiation -Lack of trust between entities 
-Bilateral relationship important 
-Formalization process and resulting 
negotiation caused eventual impasse 
-Failed negotiation led to ultimatum 
being issued and resulting impasse 
-Zero sum process 
-Focus on positions and not interests 
-Distributive bargaining 
-Trust built on mutual respect 
-Continuity of negotiating team critical 
to success and building trust 
-Focus on future and do not dwell on 
past failures 
-Focus on interests and not positions 
-Win/Win outcomes sought 
-Willingness to compromise 
-Integrative bargaining 
Conflict -Cooperativeness was high 
-Collaboration was occurring 
-Accommodation was high 
 
-Ultimatum issued that was not able 
to be resolved 
-Parties did not work through conflict 
-Unwillingness to compromise 
-Competition was high 
-Avoiding issues occurred, which 
prohibited them from being effectively 
addressed 
-Highly cooperative process 
-Parties worked through conflict to 
reach resolution 
-Willingness to compromise on issues 
-Accommodation was high 
-Consensus-building efforts were high 









Miscellaneous -Success was easier to obtain with 
only two partners engaged 
 
-Governance was required before the 
system became too large and 
unmanageable 
-Operational environment was 
changing, which necessitated change 
-Solid governance document emerged 
to become basis for later phase from 














-Operational needs were driving factors 
for policy makers to continue with 
governance development process 
-Develop governance process first 
before a system becomes operational 
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